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JUDGE RAKOFF V. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION:  ARE “NEITHER ADMIT NOR DENY” 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN SECURITIES CASES IN 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST? 
DANIEL T. HUBBELL* 
“But the ground is shaking.  There are tremors.” 
 
- Judge Victor Marrero in questioning the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s settlement agreement with S.A.C. Capital Advisors1 
 “DPAs [(Deferred Prosecution Agreements)] have had a truly 
transformative effect on particular companies and, more generally, on corporate 
culture across the globe,” declared Lanny Breuer, the head of the Criminal 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) on September 13, 2012.2  
Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements 
(NPAs) are settlement agreements between a prosecutor and a defendant in 
which the prosecutor agrees to either defer or forego prosecution in return for 
the defendant’s cooperation in an ongoing investigation or prosecution, as well as 
an agreement to comply with the requirements of the settlement.3  Rather than 
forcing prosecutors to face the “stark choice” of using the “sledgehammer” of 
criminal indictment or declining prosecution outright and simply “walking away,” 
DPAs and NPAs provide a middle road where a corporation can avoid 
prosecution in return “for an admission of wrongdoing, cooperation with the 
government’s investigation, . . . payment of monetary penalties, and concrete 
steps to improve the company’s behavior.”4  As these agreements have become “a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	   J.D. Candidate 2014, Albany Law School; M.S.N.P.L. 2008, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 
1999, Valley Forge Christian College.  The author would like to thank Professor Christine Sgarlata 
Chung for her invaluable guidance, and Di Smith for her unwavering support in the research and 
writing of this Note.  
1 Peter Lattman, Judge Is Skeptical of S.E.C. Deal with Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/judge-questions-s-e-c-settlement-with-steven-cohens-
hedge-fund/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.  
2 Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Criminal Div., Speech to the New York 
City Bar Ass’n (Sept. 13, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131.html). 
3 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enforcement, Enforcement Manual, §§ 6.2.3 & 6.2.4 
(Nov. 1, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf. 
4 Breuer, supra note 2. 
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mainstay of white collar criminal law enforcement” over the last ten years, 
prosecutors now view DPAs and NPAs as having “the same punitive, deterrent, 
and rehabilitative effect as a guilty plea.”5   
[W]hen a company enters into a DPA with the 
government, or an NPA for that matter, it almost 
always must acknowledge wrongdoing, agree to 
cooperate with the government’s investigation, pay 
a fine, agree to improve its compliance program, 
and agree to face prosecution if it fails to satisfy 
the terms of the agreement. . . .  [M]ost 
important[ly] . . . the company must virtually 
always publicly acknowledge its wrongdoing . . . in 
detail [and is prohibited from] continuing to deny 
that they did anything wrong.6 
Taking a page from the DOJ handbook, on January 13, 2010, the SEC 
announced that it was authorizing the use of DPAs and NPAs by its Division of 
Enforcement (subject to Commission approval) to “encourage individuals and 
companies to report violations and provide assistance to the agency.”7  As of the 
end of 2012, the SEC had entered into five such agreements.8  A notable 
difference between DOJ9 and SEC10 settlements, however, is the use of “neither 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage Individuals and 
Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010) (available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm). 
8 Gibson Dunn, 2012 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) And Non-
Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), 2 (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2012YearEndUpdate-
CorporateDeferredProsecution-NonProsecutionAgreements.pdf. 
9 DOJ settlement options include a plea agreement, nolo contendere, and a DPA or NPA.  See, e.g., 
United States Attorneys Manual §§ 9-27.400, 9-27.500 & 9-27.600 (Oct. 2010) (hereinafter 
U.S.A.M.). 
10 The SEC can file a case in either federal court or bring an administrative action before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ).  About the SEC, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., (Feb. 26, 2013).   
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml .The majority of the cases are settled without going 
to trial.  See id.  Settlement options include a consent judgment in federal court, a consent order in 
an ALJ proceeding, or a DPA or NPA.  Id. See also Enforcement Manual, supra note 3 §§ 6.2.3 & 
6.2.4.  Throughout this article, a consent judgment in federal court and a consent order in an ALJ 
proceeding will be referred to as “consent judgments.” 
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admit nor deny” language in SEC settlement agreements, where the corporation 
“neither admits nor denies” the statement of facts presented within the 
document.11  “Neither admit nor deny” has been long used by the SEC within its 
settlement agreements, as corporations often seek to mitigate collateral 
consequences associated with admissions, such as the use of an admission against 
the corporation in a later shareholder derivative lawsuit.12  Because this practice 
can at times lead to embarrassing results when there are parallel DOJ and SEC 
prosecutions,13 the SEC announced in January 2012 that it would no longer use 
“neither admit nor deny” language in cases of parallel criminal prosecutions.14  
However, notwithstanding the January 2012 policy change and the relative 
infrequency of both DOJ and SEC parallel prosecutions, the use of “neither 
admit nor deny” language in SEC settlement agreements with corporations 
remains the subject of intense debate.15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Edward Wyatt, Settlement With Wachovia Points Up a Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/business/contrasting-settlements-in-wachovia-
case.html?pagewanted=print (highlighting that in the DOJ settlement, Wachovia “admits, 
acknowledges and accepts responsibility” for its actions, whereas in the SEC settlement, Wachovia 
agreed to settle “without admitting or denying the allegations”). 
12 See Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Changes Policy on Firms’ Admission of Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/business/sec-to-change-policy-on-companies-
admission-of-guilt.html. 
13 As an example, Bernard Madoff pled guilty to 11 counts of fraud, money laundering, perjury 
and theft in perpetrating a $50 billion Ponzi scheme, while settling the SEC’s civil action without 
admitting or denying the allegations.  See Diana B. Henriques & Jack Healy, Madoff Goes to Jail After 
Guilty Pleas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/business/13madoff.html?pagewanted=all. See also Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Defendant Bernard L. Madoff Consents to Partial Judgment 
Imposing Permanent Injunction and Continuing Other Relief (Feb. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20889.htm. 
14 See Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Public Statement By 
SEC Staff: Recent Policy Change (Jan. 7, 2012), (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch010712rsk.htm). 
15 See Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Testimony on 
“Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators” (May 17, 2012), (transcript 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/ts051712rk.htm) (“This change will only 
affect a minority of cases . . . .”). See also William O. Reckler & Blake T. Denton, Understanding 
Recent Changes to the SEC’s “Neither Admit Nor Deny” Settlement Policy, THE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Mar.–Apr. 2012, at 4 (“Because the new policy is limited to situations in 
376 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15 
 
 Most notably, the SEC’s continued use of “neither admit nor deny” in 
proposed settlement agreements has come under increased scrutiny lately from 
Judge Jed S. Rakoff (Southern District of New York.) as well as other federal 
district judges.16  While the use of settlement agreements has benefits to both the 
SEC and corporations,17 these judges—who must approve a consent judgment or 
DPA18—have questioned whether the use of “neither admit nor deny” in these 
agreements serves the public interest at large.19  This criticism has mainly focused 
on the value of disclosing the truth of the SEC’s allegations of corporate 
misconduct “in matter[s] of obvious public importance.”20  However, where 
everyday people have lost their jobs, homes, and life savings as a result of 
corporate wrongdoing—such as the financial crisis of 2007–08 and the resulting 
Great Recession21—this debate poses an additional question: whether the use of 
“neither admit nor deny” deprives victims of the closure often found in the 
criminal justice system.22  When public outcry for the guilty to be punished is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
which there have already been admissions in a criminal case, it is unlikely to have an impact on 
most defendants.”). 
16 Peter Lattman, Court Hears Arguments on Judge’s Rejection of S.E.C.-Citigroup Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
8, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/appeals-court-hears-arguments-over-judge-
rakoffs-rejection-of-citigroup-settlement/. 
17 See generally Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, As Wall St. Polices Itself, Prosecutors use Softer 
Approach, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/business/in-shift-federal-prosecutors-are-lenient-as-
companies-break-the-law.html?pagewanted=all (noting that DPAs conserve “the government’s 
limited investigative resources” and avoid “significant negative consequences to innocent parties 
who played no role in the criminal conduct”). 
18 The main difference between a DPA and an NPA is that a DPA requires the government to file 
criminal charges with the court placing it under a judge’s purview.  An NPA is essentially a 
contract between the government and the corporation and thus no criminal charges are filed as 
long as the corporation completes the terms of the agreement.  Memorandum from Craig S. 
Morford, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys, 1 
n. 2 (Mar. 7, 2008) (available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-
03072008.pdf (hereinafter Morford Memorandum). 
19 See, e.g., SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., Editorial, Struggling in the Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/opinion/sunday/struggling-in-the-suburbs.html (noting 
the substantial rise in home foreclosures, unemployment and underemployment, as well as the 
drop in household wealth since the start of the Great Recession).  
22 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1601 (2000) (asking what is the legal system’s “proper role” in 
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great, such as in the aftermath of the financial crisis,23 “neither admit nor deny” 
may very well subvert the retributive catharsis settlement agreements are trying to 
satiate. 
 This article argues that in circumstances where the conduct of the 
corporation is particularly egregious, and the resulting impact on certain types of 
victims is both severe and far-reaching, the use of “neither admit nor deny” 
language within a settlement agreement may not be in the public interest.  In Part 
I of this article, the rise of DPAs and NPAs as the new prosecutorial tool within 
the DOJ and SEC is discussed, creating a back-story as to why the use of “neither 
admit nor deny” is an issue of increasing public importance.  Part II of this article 
examines the judicial and public criticism of the SEC’s use of “neither admit nor 
deny” within their settlement agreements as well as the policy change by the SEC 
to no longer use the language where there are parallel civil and criminal 
proceedings.  Finally, Part III of this article discusses how the use of “neither 
admit nor deny” language is not always in the public interest and evaluates 
different options that may better serve the public at large. 
I. THE RISE OF DPAS, NPAS, AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
WITHIN THE DOJ AND SEC 
In November 2012, Robert Khuzami, then director of the SEC’s Division 
of Enforcement, stated that although the SEC had used relatively few DPAs and 
NPAs since their adoption in 2010, the SEC’s goal over time was to “dovetail” 
their use with DOJ agreements in  such a way that there would be “uniformity of 
use” with more “consistency and clarity for the regulated community.”24  As the 
SEC has increasingly patterned its enforcement program after the DOJ,25 any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
helping victims achieve closure); Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 611, 619–26 (2009) (justifying the use of victim impact statements). 
23 See Ben Protess & Mark Scott, U.S. Is Building Criminal Cases in Rate-Fixing, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 
2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/14/u-s-is-building-criminal-cases-in-rate-fixing/ 
(“[T]he public is still simmering over the dearth of prosecutions of prominent executives involved 
in the mortgage crisis . . . .”). 
24 Dunn, supra note 8, at 5. 
25 In recent years, former DOJ prosecutors have taken prominent roles within the SEC, most 
recently Mary Jo White as head of the Commission.  See Ben Protess & Benjamin Weiser, A Signal 
to Wall Street in Obama’s Pick for Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 
2013),http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/mary-jo-white-to-be-named-new-s-e-c-boss/.  
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discussion of the SEC’s use of DPAs and NPAs must first begin with a brief 
history of the DOJ’s adoption of these prosecutorial tools. 
While corporate criminal liability has been black letter law since at least 
1909,26 the DOJ had no consistent policy on corporate prosecutions until the 
issuance of the so-called “Holder Memorandum” in June 1999.27  Other than 
awarding credit to companies for cooperating in a criminal investigation28—and 
other general federal prosecution policies—prosecutors could consider whatever 
other factors they deemed relevant in deciding whether to pursue a criminal 
charge against a corporation.29  While the Holder Memorandum did not require 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Robert Khuzami, the former director of the Enforcement Division, was also a star prosecutor 
within the DOJ; see also Ben Protess, Khuzami, S.E.C. Enforcement Chief Who Reinvigorated Unit, to Step 
Down, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/s-e-c-enforcement-
chief-khuzami-steps-down/. 
26 Corporate criminal liability was first recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the seminal 
decision N.Y. Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909), where the Court 
held corporations could be criminally liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  Id. at 494.  
This was recently upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Ionia Mgmt., 
S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 2009).  Additionally, a corporation can be held criminally liable 
under the collective knowledge doctrine, which provides that even though no single employee 
could be convicted of the offense because no one person possessed the requisite knowledge, all 
knowledge possessed by the corporation’s employees could be attributed to the corporation itself.  
United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).  Following the N.Y. Central 
decision, the doctrine of corporate criminal liability has largely been formed by the federal 
judiciary.  See, e.g., Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking 
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 61–71 (2007) (discussing the 
development of corporate criminal liability since 1909); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: 
One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1337–38 (2007) 
(discussing N.Y. Central). 
27 See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
Component Heads and U.S. Att’ys (June 16, 1999) (available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF) 
(hereinafter Holder Memorandum); Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, The Power of the 
Corporate Charging Decision over Corporate Conduct, 116 Yale L.J. POCKET PART 306, 308 (2007). 
28 In 1991, the U.S. Sentencing Commission published guidelines where an individual or 
organization could receive credit for having an effective compliance and ethics program in place at 
the time of the offense and where the individual or organization self-reported or cooperated in the 
investigation, as well as accepted responsibility for the criminal conduct.  See 18 U.S.C. § 8C2.5(f) 
& (g) (2012).  “An organization that qualified for the maximum ‘discounts’ could, in theory, obtain 
a ninety-five percent reduction in the fine that would otherwise be imposed.”  Harry First, Branch 
Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C.L. Rev. 23, 
37 (2010). 
29 Wray & Hur, supra note 27, at 308. 
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prosecutors to hold to its guidelines,30 it did formulate eight factors an attorney 
should consider in prosecuting a corporation: 
1. The nature and seriousness of the offense, 
including the risk of harm to the public, and 
applicable policies and priorities, if any, 
governing the prosecution of corporations for 
particular categories of crime []; 
2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the 
corporation, including the complicity in, or 
condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate 
management []; 
3. The corporation’s history of similar conduct, 
including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory 
enforcement actions against it []; 
4. The corporation’s timely and voluntary 
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to 
cooperate in the investigation of its agents, 
including, if necessary, the waiver of the 
corporate attorney-client and work product 
privileges []; 
5. The existence and adequacy of the 
corporation’s compliance program []; 
6. The corporation’s remedial actions, including 
any efforts to implement an effective 
corporate compliance program or to improve 
an existing one, to replace responsible 
management, to discipline or terminate 
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to 
cooperate with the relevant government 
agencies []; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Holder Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1 (“These factors are, however, not outcome-
determinative and are only guidelines.  Federal prosecutors are not required to reference these 
factors in a particular case, nor are they required to document the weight they accorded specific 
factors in reaching their decision.”). 
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7. Collateral consequences, including 
disproportionate harm to shareholders and 
employees not proven personally culpable []; 
and 
8. The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such 
as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.31 
Following the collapse of Enron and the indictment of Arthur 
Andersen,32 Congress passed—and President Bush signed into law—the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on July 30, 2002.33  Just prior to enacting Sarbanes-
Oxley, President Bush created, by executive order, the Corporate Fraud Task 
Force (CFTF) within the DOJ to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.34  
Less than six months after the creation of the CFTF, DOJ released the so-called 
“Thompson Memorandum” in January 2003, which made four significant 
revisions to the Holder Memorandum.35  First, an additional factor was added to 
the Holder Memorandum’s eight general factors to be weighed when prosecuting 
a corporation: “the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the 
corporation’s malfeasance . . . .”36  Second, the Thompson Memorandum was 
binding on federal prosecutors.37  Third, the memorandum stated that NPAs may 
be appropriate “in exchange for cooperation when a corporation’s ‘timely 
cooperation appears to be necessary to the public interest and other means of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Id. at 3. 
32 Enron Corporation was an energy conglomerate that achieved significant growth in the 1990’s 
aided by aggressive accounting strategies executed by its auditor, Arthur Andersen.  In 2000, 
Enron’s financial performance began to suffer and eventually collapsed when these faulty 
accounting strategies were exposed.  Arthur Andersen was indicted in March 2002 for destroying 
Enron-related documents prior to the SEC commencing an investigation.  Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698–702 (2005). See supra notes 46–56 and accompanying text. 
33 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted); First, supra note 29, at 
40–41. 
34 First, supra note 28, at 43. 
35 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of 
Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 20, 2003) (available at 
http://www.albany.edu/acc/courses/acc695spring2008/thompson%20memo.pdf) (hereinafter 
Thompson Memorandum).  See First, supra note 29, at 44; Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, 
Prosecution Deferred: Exploring the Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation, 44 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1485 (2007). 
36 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 35. 
37 Id. (“In all cases involving corporate wrongdoing, prosecutors should consider the factors 
discussed herein.”). 
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obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or would not be effective.’”38  
Fourth, and most importantly, increased emphasis was placed on the “authenticity 
of a corporation’s cooperation.”39  The main focus of the memorandum was 
clear: “[Too often business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a 
Department investigation, in fact take steps to impede the quick and effective 
exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing under investigation.  The 
revisions make clear that such conduct should weigh in favor of a corporate 
prosecution.”40   
There are two additional items of note in regards to the Thompson 
Memorandum.  First, the Thompson Memorandum represents the first time that 
the DOJ gave specific guidelines to prosecutors as to when an NPA is an 
appropriate tool for a corporate prosecution.41  In weighing whether a 
corporation has sufficiently cooperated to warrant the use of an NPA, the 
prosecutor is instructed to consider the completeness of the corporation’s 
disclosure (including possible waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product 
protections); whether the corporation is shielding its culpable employees, 
directors, and agents from individual prosecution; and whether the corporation is 
feigning cooperation while in actuality impeding the investigation.42  Secondly, the 
memorandum references the existence of the SEC’s voluntary disclosure program 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Id. 
39 See d. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.  The memorandum references the U.S. Attorney’s Manual § 9-27.600–650, which provides 
principles governing non-prosecution agreements generally.  See infra notes 81–84 and 
accompanying text.  The first DOJ NPA was with Salomon Brothers in 1993, but up until the 
Thompson Memorandum, it was rarely used. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, DOJ, 
SEC Enter $290 Million Settlement with Salomon Brothers (May 20, 1992), (available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1992/211182.htm); James R. Copland, The 
Shadow Regulatory State: The Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT, May 2012, 
at 3 (reporting how from 1993 to 2003 the DOJ entered into only 17 NPAs and DPAs).  For a 
discussion on the historical development of deferred prosecution agreements and its adaptation to 
the corporate defender, see Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred?  Judicial 
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1866–80 (2005).  
42 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 35. 
382 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15 
 
as an example of other regulatory agencies where cooperation may qualify the 
corporation for amnesty or reduced penalties.43 
Following the publication of the Thompson Memorandum—and the 
prosecution of Arthur Andersen for obstruction of justice—the DOJ radically 
changed how corporate criminal misconduct was prosecuted.44  The lesson of 
Arthur Andersen was a telling one for the DOJ.45  Arthur Andersen was the 
accounting firm for Enron Corporation, and its Houston office, in reaction to a 
pending SEC investigation, destroyed more than two tons of documents relating 
to its work for Enron from August to November 2001.46  Prior to the Enron 
scandal, Andersen had already settled two disputes with the SEC in July 2001 
over alleged fraudulent accounting and auditing work for two other companies.47  
On March 7, 2002, the DOJ obtained a sealed indictment against the firm for 
obstruction of justice in the investigation of Enron.48  Unaware that prosecutors 
had already taken the case to grand jury, on March 13, 2002, Andersen attorneys 
requested a DPA in which the firm would avoid indictment if it submitted itself 
to certain compliance measures.49  DOJ attorneys never responded, and 
immediately following the unsealing of the indictment the next day, Andersen 
clients began departing en masse.50  Deferral negotiations continued for the next 
month, culminating with Andersen receiving a formal DPA document on April 
12, 2002 where the firm would avoid a guilty plea in exchange for admitting its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See id.  See also infra note 101. 
44 In the five years after the Thompson Memo, the only corporation subject to a criminal trial was 
Arthur Andersen.  First, supra note 28, at 49.  Alternatively, over that same time period, DOJ’s 
Corporate Fraud Task Force obtained 1,236 convictions all of which were individuals and not 
corporations.  Id.; see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: President’s Corporate Fraud Task 
Force Marks Five Years of Ensuring Corporate Integrity (July 17, 2007 (available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/July/07_odag_507.html. 
45 See Morgenson & Story, supra note 17 (noting that the reversal of Andersen’s conviction by the 
Supreme Court signaled the end of “brass knuckle prosecutions” of white-collar crime by the 
DOJ).  
46 See, Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 107-08 (2006).   
47 Id. at 107.   
48 Richard B. Schmitt, Devon Spurgeon & Jonathan Weil, Andersen’s Tug of War With Justice: How 
Firm’s Plan to Settle Fell Apart, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2002), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1019179253429267920,00.html.   
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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misconduct and adopting certain compliance measures.51  Andersen, however, 
rejected the final settlement offers, rationalizing that with its business already in 
shambles, facing trial was preferable to the “onerous” terms of the DPA.52  The 
firm was convicted by jury in June 2002 and immediately began wrapping up its 
accounting business.53  Three years later, Andersen’s conviction was unanimously 
overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, and the DOJ subsequently dropped the 
case.54  However, the damage was done.  Prior to its indictment, the firm was a 
$9.3 billion business with 85,000 employees worldwide.55  By the time of the 
reversal of its conviction, the firm was all but non-existent.56 
As the legal community watched the destruction of Andersen, heavy 
criticism mounted as to whether it was proper for prosecutors to hold a 
corporation criminally liable.57  Notably, a corporate criminal indictment has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 16, 2002, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/16/business/andersen-guilty-in-effort-to-block-
inquiry-on-enron.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
54 See Carrie Johnson, U.S. Ends Prosecution of Arthur Andersen, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2005, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/22/AR2005112201852.html.  The only individual criminally 
charged at Andersen, David Duncan, a former Houston office partner who had pled guilty to 
obstruction of justice in exchange for his testimony against the firm, withdrew his guilty plea in 
the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision.  Id. 
55 Gibson Dunn, 2008 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements, (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2008year-endupdate-
corporatedpas.aspx. 
56 Id. 
57 See, e.g., Ainslie, supra note 46, at 110 (arguing that “[s]tringent civil violations can be imposed on 
renegade parts of business entities with far less collateral damage to innocent individuals than can 
criminal prosecutions of the business entity itself.”); Hasnas, supra note 26, at 1329 (stating that 
“there is no theoretical justification for corporate criminal liability.”); Albert W. Alschuler, Two 
Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2009) ("The 
embarrassment of corporate criminal liability is that it punishes the innocent along with the 
guilty."); David A. Maas, Policing the Ratings Agencies: The Case for Stronger Criminal Disincentives in the 
Credit Rating Market, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1005 (2011) (examining why there have 
been no criminal prosecutions against the ratings agencies’ actors after the 2007–08 financial 
crisis); Jeff Izant, Mens Rea and the Martin Act: A Weapon of Choice for Securities Fraud Prosecutions?, 
2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 913 (2012) (arguing that state enforcement—such as New York State’s 
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negative collateral consequences to innocent parties, in particular employees, 
investors, and creditors who had no role in or knowledge of the misconduct.58  
Partially in response to this criticism and partially due to incidences of high profile 
criminal misconduct by corporate executives at the time,59 prosecutors began to 
increase the use of DPAs and NPAs in prosecuting corporations,60 often exacting 
harsh concessions as the “price” of cooperation.  Some examples of these harsh 
concessions included requiring the waiver of attorney-client and work product 
protection privileges,61 coercing cooperation of individual employees within the 
government’s investigation, and appointing independent directors or internal 
monitoring systems.62   
However, the courts began to push back on these heavy handed 
techniques.  In June and July of 2006—in two cases involving a settlement 
agreement with the firm KPMG—the federal bench found unconstitutional 
portions of the Thompson Memorandum that granted prosecutors the authority 
to require—as part of gauging corporate cooperation in considering a settlement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Martin Act”—may be a more effective means of criminal prosecution of securities fraud related 
to the financial crisis); Peter J. Henning, Making Sure “The Buck Stops Here”: Barring Executives from 
Corporate Violations, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91 (2012) (advising against expanding the criminal law 
in prosecuting corporate executives and rather giving the SEC the administrative power to exclude 
executives from holding a position of authority with public corporations). 
58 See Alschuler, supra note 57, at 1367 ([C]riminal punishment cannot really be borne by a fictional 
entity. . . .  [It] is inflicted instead on human beings whose guilt remains unproven.  Innocent 
shareholders pay the fines, and innocent employees, creditors, customers, and communities 
sometimes feel the pinch too.  The embarrassment of corporate criminal liability is that it punishes 
the innocent along with the guilty.”). 
59 See First, supra note 28, at 45.  The period from 2001 to 2006, commencing with the collapse of 
Enron, has become known as the “Enron Era.”  Editorial, Sizing up the Enron Era, CHI. TRIBUNE, 
May 26, 2006, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-05-
26/news/0605260226_1_ceo-jeffrey-skilling-skilling-and-lay-worldcom-ceo-bernard-ebbers. 
60 A study by Gibson Dunn shows that the DOJ entered into two DPA and NPA agreements in 
2002; six in 2003; eight in 2004; 14 in 2005; 24 in 2006; and 39 in 2007.  Dunn, supra note 8, at 1. 
61 In 2005, the so-called “McCallum Memorandum” revised a portion of the Thompson 
Memorandum, requiring a review and approval process prior to seeking waiver of the attorney-
client privilege or work product protection.   Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Acting 
Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys (Oct. 21, 
2005) (available at 
http://federalevidence.com/pdf/Corp_Prosec/McCallum_Memo_10_21_05.pdf). 
62 Bohrer & Trencher, supra note 35, at 1485–86.  Other notorious provisions within these 
agreements included requiring the corporation to install slot machines at a state-franchised horse 
racing facility, endow a chair at the alma mater of the prosecutor who negotiated the agreement, 
and create 1,600 jobs in a state within ten years.  Id. at 1486. 
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agreement—the mandatory availability of employees for questioning in a 
government investigation.63  In both cases, the court held that KPMG’s threats to 
withhold legal fees and fire employees unless the employees cooperated in an 
ongoing criminal investigation violated the employees’ Fifth Amendment due 
process rights and Sixth Amendment right to counsel.64   
In response to the Stein decisions—and mounting criticism over DOJ 
settlement agreements requiring the waiver of attorney-client privileges and work 
product protection—the Thompson Memorandum was revised in December 
2006 by the so-called “McNulty Memorandum.”65  There, the nine factors 
prosecutors use to consider whether or not to prosecute a corporation remained 
largely unchanged.66  While continuing to emphasize the necessity of corporate 
cooperation,67 however, the McNulty Memorandum curtailed the instances in 
which a prosecutor may request a waiver of attorney-client privilege or work 
product protection.68  In laying out a balancing test of considerations, as well as a 
step-by-step process for requesting attorney-client or work product material, the 
McNulty Memorandum instructs prosecutors to “seek the least intrusive waiver 
necessary to conduct a complete and thorough investigation.”69  The McNulty 
Memorandum also instructs prosecutors to “not take into account whether a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 541 F.3d 130 (2d 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Stein (Stein II), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
64 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (holding that the Thompson Memorandum, coupled with 
DOJ conduct, violated the defendant-employees Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights); Stein II, 440 
F. Supp. 2d at 337 (holding that defendant-employees’ statements were coerced as “a product of 
intentional government action”).  For a discussion of the DOJ’s prosecution of KPMG, see First, 
supra note 28, at 50–53. 
65 First, supra note 28, at 53. 
66 Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of 
Dep’t Components, U.S. Atty’s (Dec. 12, 2006) (available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf) (hereinafter McNulty 
Memorandum). 
67 Id. at VII.B (“a corporation’s cooperation may be critical in identifying the culprits and locating 
relevant evidence”). 
68 Id. at VII.B.2 (“Prosecutors may only request waiver of attorney-client or work product 
protections when there is a legitimate need for the privileged information to fulfill their law 
enforcement obligations.”). 
69 Id. 
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corporation is advancing attorneys’ fees to employees or agents under 
investigation and indictment” when evaluating the corporation’s level of 
cooperation.70  However, where the “totality of the circumstances show that it 
was intended to impede a criminal investigation,” the advancement of attorneys’ 
fees to employees may be considered.71  Commentators agreed that despite the 
limitations placed on prosecutors within the McNulty Memorandum, 
corporations under investigation were still essentially at the mercy of the 
prosecutor and are often required to “offer and give complete and genuine 
cooperation . . . to escape an indictment.”72 
In August 2008, the DOJ released the latest iteration of the factors to 
consider in prosecuting a corporation.73  Now incorporated within the U.S. 
Attorney’s Manual in section 9-28.000, the so-called “Filip Memorandum” retains 
the nine factors found within the McNulty Memorandum as well as the 
prosecutor’s discretion as to whether or not to prosecute a corporation.74  Going 
further than the McNulty Memorandum, the Filip Memorandum restricts the 
prosecutor’s ability to request a waiver of attorney-client and work product 
material.75  Rather than predicating cooperation credit on the waiver of these 
protections, prosecutors are now instructed to seek “disclosure of the relevant 
facts” concerning the alleged misconduct.76  Additionally, prosecutors are not to 
consider whether the corporation is advancing attorneys’ fees to employees under 
investigation or indictment, unless the payment of fees is used to obstruct the 
investigation.77  Enacted in response to criticisms that the DOJ had gone too far 
in requiring waivers of these legal protections, these restrictions signal a further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Id. at VII.B.3. 
71 Id. at VII.B.3 n. 3. 
72 Bohrer & Trencher, supra note 35, at 1488; see McNulty Memorandum, supra note 67, at III.B 
(“[T]he prosecutor generally has wide latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even 
whether to prosecute for violations of federal criminal law.”).  See also Thompson Memorandum, 
supra note 36, at II.B (quoting the same). 
73 See Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t 
Components, U.S. Atty’s (Aug. 28, 2008) (available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf) (hereinafter Filip 
Memorandum).  See also U.S.A.M. § 9-28.000. 
74 See Filip Memorandum, supra note 73; U.S.A.M. § 9-28.300(A) & (B). 
75 U.S.A.M.  § 9-28.710 (“[P]rosecutors should not ask for such waivers and are directed not to do 
so.”). 
76 U.S.A.M. § 9-28.720. 
77 U.S.A.M.  § 9-28.730. 
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step back from the aggressive prosecutorial strategies seen during the Enron 
Era.78  Most importantly, corporate cooperation remains the key factor: 
For these reasons and more, cooperation can be a 
favorable course for both the government and the 
corporation.  Cooperation benefits the 
government – and ultimately shareholders, 
employees, and other often blameless victims – by 
allowing prosecutors and federal agents, for 
example, to avoid protracted delays, which 
compromise their ability to quickly uncover and 
address the full extent of widespread corporate 
crimes.  With cooperation by the corporation, the 
government may be able to reduce tangible losses, 
limit damage to reputation, and preserve assets for 
restitution.  At the same time, cooperation may 
benefit the corporation by enabling the 
government to focus its investigative resources in a 
manner that will not unduly disrupt the 
corporation’s legitimate business operations.  In 
addition, and critically, cooperation may benefit the 
corporation by presenting it with the opportunity to earn 
credit for its efforts.79 
 Thus, with corporate cooperation remaining at the center of DOJ 
philosophy in prosecuting corporations, DPAs and NPAs—as currently used 
post-Filip Memorandum—are encouraged as “a middle ground that balances the 
collateral consequences of prosecuting corporations . . . against the likelihood of 
obtaining restitution, rehabilitating the corporation and engendering respect for 
the law and trust and confidence in enforcement authorities.”80 
 Turning now to the substance of NPAs and DPAs, section 9-27.600 of 
the U.S. Attorneys Manual states that an NPA is an appropriate tool for obtaining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 U.S.A.M. § 9-28.710 (discussing the legal community’s criticism of DOJ policies that coerced 
corporations into waiving attorney-client privilege and work product protection). 
79 U.S.A.M.  § 9-28.700 (emphasis added). 
80 Thomas F. O’Neill & Brendan T. Kennedy, Answering to a Higher Authority: Sovereign-Mandated 
Oversight in the Board Room and the C-Suite, 17 FORDHAM  J. CORP. & FIN. L. 299, 321 (2012). 
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cooperation from a corporation where other means of obtaining cooperation are 
unavailable or ineffective and the necessity of the corporation’s cooperation is in 
the public interest.81  Prior to entering into an NPA, a prosecutor is required to 
consider whether obtaining the cooperation sought is of such a great public 
interest that it justifies foregoing prosecution of the corporation.82  In making this 
determination, the prosecutor should weigh the significance of the investigation 
or prosecution, the value of the corporation’s cooperation to the prosecutor’s 
case, and the corporation’s culpability in the misconduct and prior criminal 
history.83  If the prosecutor decides that an NPA would be an appropriate tool to 
engender cooperation, the NPA should be limited in scope so as not to extend 
“blanket immunity” to the corporation.84 
 While the NPA surrenders the opportunity to prosecute a cooperating 
corporation, the DPA defers prosecution for a certain period of time, which is 
contingent upon the corporation’s fulfillment of a number of obligations.85  
Unlike an NPA, with the DPA a charging document is filed with the courts as 
well as an uncontested Statement of Facts.86  If the corporation has adhered to 
the obligations within the agreement throughout the deferral period, the 
prosecutor may drop the charges;87 however, if the prosecutor determines that the 
corporation has breached the agreement, the corporation may be prosecuted with 
its admissions used against it.88  Thus, both NPAs and DPAs serve as powerful 
tools—not only to secure the corporation’s cooperation in an important 
investigation or prosecution—but also as a means to regulate corporate behavior 
without expending large amounts of prosecutorial resources.89 
 The reason why these settlement agreements are so attractive—and hence 
so powerful—lies in the collateral consequences to a corporation as a result of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 U.S.A.M. § 9-27.600(B). 
82 U.S.A.M. § 9-27.600(B)(3). 
83 U.S.A.M. § 9-27.620(A). 
84 U.S.A.M. § 9-27.630(B). 
85 Greenblum, supra note 41, at 1864. 
86 Morford Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1 n. 2. 
87 Greemblum, supra note 41, at 1864. 
88 Id. 
89 See Copland, supra note 41, at 12 (“[T]he expanded use of DPAs and NPAs . . . in effect has 
shifted power from regulators typically employing cost-benefit analysis to prosecutors charged 
with enforcing bright-line rules.”). 
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criminal indictment.90  Federal prosecutors are instructed to weigh the effects of a 
conviction or indictment in resolving a corporate criminal case.91  Such 
consequences include the loss of jobs for employees, reduction in shareholder 
value, diminishment of retirement benefits for pensioners, and loss of 
customers—many of whom may have been innocent parties with no role or 
awareness of the criminal conduct.92  Additionally, for those corporations engaged 
in regulated industries (such as public accountants), government contracts, or 
federally funded programs (such as health care programs), non-penal sanctions 
that may accompany a criminal indictment, such as a suspension or debarment, 
can have a crippling effect on a corporation.93  As previously discussed, the 
specter of Arthur Andersen continues to loom large over corporate 
prosecutions.94 
 As a result, the use of DPAs and NPAs has surged since the downfall of 
Arthur Andersen.95  According to records compiled by Gibson Dunn & Crutcher 
LLP, since 2000 there have been a total of 245 DPAs and NPAs entered into 
between corporations and the government.96  The high water marks for these 
agreements were 2007 and 2010, with a total of 39 such agreements in each year.97  
Ranked second is 2012, with a total of 35 agreements, and since the SEC’s 
announcement in 2010 to use DPAs and NPAs, the Commission has entered into 
5 such agreements.98  Thus, in exchange for avoiding a corporate death sentence, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Id. at 11.  
91 U.S.A.M. § 9-28.100. 
92 Id.. See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271, 280 
(2008) (“The perception that the reputational consequences of a conviction could exceed even the 
substantial monetary penalties in any parallel civil litigation can explain why firms under 
investigation for criminal violations are willing to do almost whatever it takes—including waiving 
attorney-client privilege, assisting the government’s prosecution of their senior officers, and 
paying millions of dollars in civil fines—to avoid an indictment.”). 
93 See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 92, at 278-79 (noting the effect of a criminal conviction to a 
corporation in a regulated industry); see also U.S.A.M. § 9-28.100.  
94 See supra notes 46–56 and accompanying text.  
95 Dunn, supra note 8, at 1. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1–2. 
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a corporation typically agrees to fully cooperate in the government investigation 
by disclosing all relevant facts; adhering to all provisions of the DPA or NPA and 
all statutes and regulations governing the corporation’s business; paying a fine; 
creating or continuing a compliance program; adopting new policies and 
procedures to ensure corporate compliance; retaining a monitor; waiving any and 
all defenses; and in the case of a DPA, not denying the appended Statement of 
Facts.99 
 Given the fallout from the 2007–08 financial meltdown and the ever 
increasing complexity of frauds within the expanding regulatory environment, the 
SEC announced its adoption of these tools in January 2010.100  While cooperation 
agreements have, in theory, been a part of the SEC’s tool belt since the early 
1970s,101 and while formal guidelines were promulgated in 2001 pursuant to 
Section 21A of the 1934 Act,102 it was not until the implementation of the 
“Cooperation Initiative” that the SEC fully adopted this approach.103  Citing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 First, supra note 28, at 47. 
100 Press Release, supra note 7; see also Khuzami, supra note 15 (noting that since Fiscal Year 2009, 
numerous enforcement actions have involved “highly complex financial products, market 
practices, and transactions where the investor harm is great, the investigatory hurdles are 
significant, and the perpetrators most elusive”). 
101 The birth of the SEC’s “Voluntary Disclosure Program” was in the early 1970s investigation of 
illegal campaign contributions made by corporations during the 1972 presidential campaign.  First, 
supra note 28, at 32.  This investigation revealed that more than 450 American corporations had 
paid bribes to overseas and domestic political or commercial officials and led to the enactment of 
the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL 
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITY AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 449 (Northeastern University Press 1995) (1982).  During this 
investigation, the SEC began to encourage companies to perform internal reviews before SEC 
action and to disclose the results of the review to the Commission.  First, supra note 28, at 33.  
This policy was later institutionalized in 1991 with the acceptance of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual.  Id., at 36-37; see also 18 U.S.C. § 8C2.5 (2012). 
102 The Seaboard Report, in which the SEC set forth four criteria in which it would consider how 
much credit to give to a corporation or individual for “self-policing, self-reporting, remediation 
and cooperation” was released in October 2001.  Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 
21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of 
Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001) 
(hereinafter the Seaboard Report) (available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-
44969.htm).   The criteria included the nature of the misconduct involved, the circumstances 
under which misconduct arose, where in the organization the misconduct occurred, and the 
duration of the misconduct.  See id.  The Seaboard Report was later incorporated into the SEC 
Enforcement Manual at § 6.1.2.  Enforcement Manual, supra note 3, § 6.1.2. 
103 See Enforcement Manual, supra note 3, § 6. 
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“complexity of the markets and products [the SEC] patrol[s], the finite resources 
at [the SEC’s] disposal, and . . . the consequences for investors,” these incentives 
are designed to “secure cooperation of persons who saw, heard and witnessed 
securities fraud first-hand.”104  As reflected in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement 
Manual, the enforcement staff is instructed to determine whether the public 
interest in securing cooperation justifies the credit given for cooperation.105  In 
making this determination, the SEC is to assess the value and nature of the 
cooperation, the importance of the investigation, the societal interest in holding 
the individual or entity accountable for their misconduct, and the individual’s or 
entity’s history of misconduct and opportunity for future misconduct.106  Under 
the principles formulated by the Seaboard Report in 2001, an entity’s cooperation 
is best measured by its self-monitoring efforts leading up to the discovery of the 
misconduct, a prompt and complete public disclosure of the misconduct, 
remedial measures to rectify and prevent the misconduct, and cooperation with 
law enforcement in the investigation.107  If the SEC determines that it is in its best 
interest to foster cooperation, there are a number of tools available to the 
enforcement staff, including proffer agreements, cooperation agreements, DPAs, 
NPAs, and immunity requests.108 
 According to the Enforcement Manual, a DPA is a written agreement 
between the SEC and a potential cooperating individual or corporation in which 
the SEC agrees to “forego an enforcement action” against the individual or 
corporation for a set period of time as long as the individual or corporation 
cooperates in the investigation, complies with the requirements of the DPA 
(including payment of a fine), and agrees to either admit or not deny the SEC’s 
allegations.109  Similar to a DOJ DPA, if the SEC determines that the agreement 
has been breached, an enforcement action may be brought against the individual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Speech by SEC Staff: 
Remarks at News Conference Announcing Enforcement Cooperation Initiative and New Senior 
Leaders (Jan. 13, 2010), (available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310rsk.htm). 
105 Enforcement Manual, supra note 3, § 6.1.1. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at § 6.1.2. 
108 Id. at § 6.2. 
109 Id. at § 6.2.3. 
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or corporation, and any factual admissions may be used to file a summary 
judgment motion.110  Notably, SEC staff is to consider any collateral 
consequences to the individual or corporation in drafting the relevant facts in 
which the individual or corporation will either admit or agree to not deny.111 
 An NPA, rather, is entered into only in “limited and appropriate 
circumstances” where the SEC declines to pursue an enforcement action against 
an individual or corporation, as long as the individual or corporation cooperates 
in the investigation and complies with the requirements of the NPA (including 
payment of a fine).112  Unlike a DPA, there is no requirement for the individual or 
corporation to admit or not deny the SEC’s allegations, and like the DOJ NPA, 
no statement of facts is required to be appended to the agreement.113  In addition 
to the typical cooperation analysis for a settlement agreement, the SEC, in 
determining whether to use an NPA, should also consider the possibility of the 
individual or corporation entering into a criminal plea agreement that would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Id. 
111 Id.  The SEC has entered into two DPAs, one with Tenaris, S.A. and the second with the 
Amish Helping Fund.  In the Tenaris DPA, the corporation “without admitting or denying the 
allegations . . . offered to accept responsibility for its conduct and to not contest or contradict the 
factual statements” within the document.  Deferred Prosecution Agreement—Tenaris, S.A., U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 17, 2011) (hereinafter Tenaris DPA).  However, the DPA permits 
Tenaris to deny the factual statements within the agreement in later litigation in which the SEC is 
not a party.  See id.  In the Amish Helping Fund DPA, the corporation “offered to accept 
responsibility for its conduct and to not contest or contradict the factual statements” within the 
document.  Deferred Prosecution Agreement—Amish Helping Fund, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(July 17, 2010) (hereinafter Helping Fund DPA).  “Neither admit nor deny” language was not 
present within the agreement.  See id.  Like the Tenaris DPA, the agreement permits the Amish 
Helping Fund to deny the factual statements within the agreement in later litigation in which the 
SEC is not a party.  See id. 
112 Enforcement Manual, supra note 3, § 6.2.4. 
113 Id.  The SEC’s first NPA, with Carter’s, Inc., did not contain a statement of facts, though 
Carter’s did agree to not make any public statements denying the factual allegations of the 
agreement.  See Non-Prosecution Agreement—Carter’s, Inc., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 
23, 2010) (hereinafter Carter’s NPA).  On the other hand, the NPAs with both the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae) had an appended statement of facts in which the corporations “accepted 
responsibility for their conduct” and agreed to not make any public statements denying the factual 
allegations of the agreement.  See Non-Prosecution Agreement—Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 15, 2011) (hereinafter Freddie Mac NPA); Non-
Prosecution Agreement— Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 15, 2011) (hereinafter Fannie Mae NPA). 
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require future cooperation with the SEC and whether there are alternative timely 
and effective means to secure the cooperation.114 
 Given the SEC’s history of resolving enforcement actions through 
consent judgments115 and the relatively few DPAs and NPAs used by the SEC 
over the past three years, one must ask whether the adoption of these new tools 
means any marked change in SEC policy.  Yet, there are two important 
considerations for using DPAs and NPAs, both relevant as to whether these tools 
are within the public interest.  First, as noted previously, the Enforcement Manual 
only imposes two basic requirements on a corporation who enters into a DPA or 
NPA with the SEC: 1) cooperate fully and truthfully in the SEC’s investigation 
and 2) comply with the settlement agreement.116  Thus, if the DPA or NPA does 
not have a statement of facts, a corporation may very well be able to settle an 
enforcement action without the public having any knowledge as to what 
misconduct actually occurred.117  Additionally, given the SEC’s history with 
consent judgments and administrative law proceedings, where there is a statement 
of facts appended to the agreement, a corporation may very well be able to still 
settle the enforcement action without admitting the allegations.118  Under this 
scenario, both the SEC’s and the corporation’s interests have been satisfied.  The 
SEC has “won” a case while preserving its precious prosecutorial resources, and 
the corporation has put to rest a period of misconduct and minimized its 
exposure to harmful collateral consequences.119  Unfortunately, the question that 
has until recently been oft forgotten is that while settlement agreements may be in 
the best interest of the SEC and the corporation, is a settlement agreement—in 
which the truth of the allegations are neither admitted nor denied—within the 
best interest of the public at large?120 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Enforcement Manual, supra note 3 § 6.2.4 (referring to the Seaboard Report). 
115 See Wyatt, supra note 11. 
116 Enforcement Manual, supra note 3, §§ 6.2.3 & 6.2.4 (stating that in some circumstances, a 
corporation may be required to admit or not deny an appended statement of facts). 
117 The Enforcement Manual states that only a DPA will be made available to the public upon 
request, unless the SEC directs otherwise.  Id. at § 6.2.3. 
118 See SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 308–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)  
(discussing the SEC’s historical use of “neither admit nor deny” within consent judgments).  
119 Khuzami, supra note 15. 
120 See Vitesse Semiconductor, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 309. 
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II. ASSESSING “NEITHER ADMIT NOR DENY” 
 To begin, the teeth of a DPA or a NPA is within the prosecutorial power 
the SEC may invoke if it finds the corporation to be in breach of the 
agreement.121  Unlike a consent judgment where the SEC seeks to prospectively 
invoke the Court’s contempt power,122 DPAs and NPAs typically escape judicial 
review.123  When DPAs do find themselves in court, federal judges generally 
review the documents under contract law and only for the purposes of enforcing 
the terms of the agreement.124  Due to the federal court’s limited role, there has 
been increased support over the years for greater judicial involvement within the 
DPA and NPA process.125  While the McNulty and Filip Memorandums have 
sought to curb a number of the prosecutorial abuses found within these 
agreements,126 practically speaking, the SEC and a corporation under investigation 
have been able to settle enforcement actions on their own terms and out of the 
purview of the public if they so desire.  Given the court’s recent responses to the 
absence of sufficient facts within SEC consent judgments, the risk is high that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Enforcement Manual, supra note 3, §§ 6.2.3 & 6.2.4. 
122 See SEC v. Bank of America Corp. (Bank of America I), 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
123 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-110, DOJ Has Taken Steps to Better Track Its Use 
of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, but Should Evaluate Effectiveness, 25 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10110.pdf (noting that, statutorily, NPAs are not required to 
receive judicial review because there are no court filings, and practically, judges are generally 
uninvolved in the DPA process). 
124 See United States v. Kelly, 646 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1253 (D. Kan. 2009) (“[A] diversion 
agreement is a contract between the prosecutor and the defendant.”).  See generally Candace Zierdt 
& Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. 
L. J. 1 (2007) (discussing DPAs and NPAs through the lens of contract policing theory).  Under 
administrative law principles, the federal courts “have long recognized that considerable weight 
should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted 
to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations . . . .”  Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  Most recently, the 
Second Circuit held, “[w]hile we are not certain we would go so far as to hold that under no 
circumstances may courts review an agency decision to settle, the scope of a court's authority to 
second-guess an agency's discretionary and policy-based decision to settle is at best minimal.”  
SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2012). 
125 See Greenblum, supra note 41, at 1896 (calling for judicial involvement to curb prosecutorial 
power and allow for “a more effective and accountable mechanism for reforming delinquent 
corporations”).  See also Copland, supra note 41, at 12–13 (recommending that judicial oversight 
will increase transparency, consistency, and effectiveness of DPAs). 
126 See supra note 75. 
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greater use of DPAs and NPAs—as an alternative settlement agreement to 
consent judgments—will result in less public awareness of the misconduct of 
some corporations.127 
 Recent judicial criticism of SEC settlements is best explained through a 
series of opinions by Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York 
from 2009 through 2011.  In September 2009, Judge Rakoff rejected a settlement 
agreement between the SEC and Bank of America over allegations that Bank of 
America had misled its shareholders in seeking approval for its $50 billion 
acquisition of Merrill Lynch.128  Judge Rakoff found that the $33 million 
settlement, in which Bank of America would neither admit nor deny the 
allegations, was not fair to the shareholders who were the innocent victims of a 
multi-billion-dollar lie.129  In responding to the SEC’s justification of the 
settlement, Judge Rakoff stated, “[it] makes no sense . . . that Bank of America 
shareholders, having been lied to blatantly in connection with the multi-billion-
dollar purchase of a huge, nearly-bankrupt company, need to lose another $33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 See SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). This isn’t 
the first time the SEC has run into difficulty with “neither admit nor deny.”  In September 2000, 
the SEC settled an enforcement action against Jonathon Lebed, a 15-year old high school student 
who had made $272,826 by buying penny-stocks and then artificially inflating their prices by 
relentlessly promoting them on the Internet and finally selling the stock high.  Jonathan Lebed, 
Securities Act No. 7891, WL 1353040 (Sept. 20, 2000); see also Michael Lewis, Jonathan Lebed: Stock 
Manipulator, S.E.C. Nemesis – and 15, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2001), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/25/magazine/25STOCK-TRADER.html.  While agreeing to 
forfeit $285,000, Lebed also agreed to neither admit nor deny the SEC’s allegations.  See id.  After 
settlement, Lebed stated on the 60 Minutes television program, "Yes, (I manipulated stocks), but I 
wasn't doing anything wrong. . . . I wasn't posting any kind of false information."  60 Minutes (CBS 
television broadcast Oct. 22, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
18560_162-242489.html).  The SEC never sought to hold Lebed in breach of the settlement 
agreement.  See Neil Roland, Teen Sued Over Stock Fraud May Face Criminal Charges, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (Oct. 6, 2000), available at www.siliconinvestor.com/readmsg.aspx?msgid=14594776 (noting 
the SEC “is finished with Lebed”). 
128 See SEC v. Bank of America Corp. (Bank of America I), 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (stating that the appropriate standard of judicial review for a settlement between the SEC 
and a corporation is whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public 
interest); see also infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.  
129 In acquiring Merrill Lynch, Bank of America represented within its proxy statement seeking 
shareholder approval that Merrill would not pay year-end bonuses to its executives prior to the 
closing of the merger in 2008.  See Bank of America I, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508.  In actuality, Bank of 
America had agreed that Merrill could pay $5.8 billion in bonuses to Merrill executives.  See id.  
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million of their money in order to ‘better assess the quality and performance of 
management’ . . . .”130  Further, Judge Rakoff characterized Bank of America’s 
willingness to pay the penalty as a cost of doing business, which he considered to 
be even more shocking in light of the fact that Bank of America had received a 
$40 billion “bail out” in taxpayer funds—$20 billion of which had come after the 
merger.131  The settlement was also deemed to be unreasonable because the facts 
surrounding the alleged misconduct were not described in sufficient detail so that 
the court could discern exactly what type of future misconduct it was granting an 
injunctive remedy against.132  Lastly, Judge Rakoff concluded that a fine of $33 
million—to be borne by innocent shareholders and not by the executives and 
attorneys who drafted the proxy statement—was grossly inadequate when 
compared to the “false statement that materially infected a multi-billion-dollar 
merger.”133  In concluding his decision, Judge Rakoff stated what has become a 
repeated refrain:  
[T]he S.E.C. gets to claim that it is exposing 
wrongdoing on the part of the [corporation] in a 
high-profile merger; the [corporation] gets to claim 
that they have been coerced into an onerous 
settlement by overzealous regulators.  And all this is 
done at the expense, not only of the shareholders, 
but also of the truth.134 
 Five-months later, Judge Rakoff approved, albeit reluctantly, a revised 
settlement agreement between the SEC and Bank of America over the same 
allegations.135  This time around, the settlement contained a series of prophylactic 
measures to prevent similar future misconduct as well as monetary penalties, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Id. at 509.  The $33 million represents the monetary fine imposed on the bank as part of the 
settlement.  Id. at 508. 
131 See id. at 510, n. 1. 
132 Id. at 511.  Bank of America, in its papers to the court, maintained that it never made false or 
misleading statements, and thus, Judge Rakoff assumed, absent the injunction sought by the SEC, 
the Bank would see nothing wrong with issuing the exact same kind of proxy statement in the 
future.  See id. 
133 Id. at 512. 
134 Id. 
135 See SEC v. Bank of America Corp. (Bank of America II), 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(“In the exercise of that self-restraint, this Court, while shaking its head, grant’s the S.E.C.’s 
motion and approves the proposed Consent Judgment . . . .”). 
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some of which would partially compensate the victims.136  This version of the 
agreement was notably different in that the parties had conducted extensive 
discovery, including a waiver of attorney-client privilege by Bank of America 
which resulted in a 35-page Statement of Facts and a 13-page Supplemental 
Statement of Facts, neither of which was challenged by Bank of America.137  
While finding that the prophylactic measures instituted by Bank of America and 
overseen by the SEC were “helpful,” Judge Rakoff still took issue with the 
monetary penalty that had now risen to $150 million.138  Though “not ideal,” the 
penalty effectively transferred $150 million from all shareholders to those current 
Bank of America shareholders who were victims of the misconduct, thus 
renegotiating the price Bank of America paid for Merrill had the proxy statement 
not been misleading.139  For Judge Rakoff, this result was palatable, but he still 
took umbrage to the fact that while those responsible for the misconduct—the 
Bank executives—could not receive any portion of the $150 million fine, they 
were also not meaningfully contributing to its payment.140  In the end, Judge 
Rakoff was still tempted to reject the settlement but granted “substantial 
deference” to the SEC and approved the settlement citing “judicial restraint.”141  
Ultimately for Judge Rakoff, the difference between the two proposed settlements 
was the hundreds of pages of testimony and other evidentiary material that fully 
disclosed the relevant facts of Bank of America’s misconduct.142 
 In SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., while approving a settlement between 
the SEC and Vitesse Semiconductor for violations of certain securities 
regulations, Judge Rakoff provided a more detailed context as to why the use of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 See id. at *3. 
137 See id. at *1. 
138 Id. at *4. 
139 Id. at *5. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at *6.  Both in Bank of America I and Bank of America II, the SEC and Bank of America 
repeatedly reminded Judge Rakoff of the “considerable deference” the court should give to the 
SEC as a regulatory body.  See Bank of America I, 653 F. Supp. 2d  at 508; Bank of America II, 2010 
WL 624581 at *6. 
142 See Bank of America II, 2010 WL 624581 at *5 (“[The settlement’s] greatest virtue is that it is 
premised on a much better developed statement of the underlying facts and inferences drawn 
therefrom . . . .”). 
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“neither admit nor deny” should be placed under greater scrutiny.143  In tracing 
the historic origins of “neither admit nor deny,” Judge Rakoff laid out the 
rationale for the use of the language within these settlements: 
Long before 1972, the S.E.C. had already begun 
entering into consent decrees in which the 
defendants neither admitted nor denied the 
allegations.  This was strongly desired by the 
defendants because it meant that their agreement 
to the S.E.C.’s settlements would not have 
collateral estoppel consequences for parallel 
private civil actions, in which the defendants 
frequently faced potential monetary judgments far 
greater than anything the S.E.C. was likely to 
impose.  But there were benefits for the S.E.C. as 
well.  First, the practice made it much easier for 
the S.E.C. to obtain settlements.  And second, at a 
time (prior to 1972) when the S.E.C.’s 
enforcement powers were largely limited to 
obtaining injunctive relief, the S.E.C.’s focus was 
somewhat more centered on helping to curb 
future misconduct by obtaining access to the 
Court’s contempt powers than on obtaining 
admissions prior to misconduct.144 
 However, by 1972, it was clear that in following the court’s approval of a 
settlement, the defendant would often enter into public campaigns in which she 
denied wrongdoing and claimed she had settled with the SEC only to avoid 
extended litigation.145  To steer clear of this result, the SEC began to include, in 
each settlement, a provision that expressly forbade the defendant from denying 
the allegations.146  According to Judge Rakoff, the result has become “a stew of 
confusion and hypocrisy” leaving only one thing certain: “the public will never 
know whether the S.E.C.’s charges are true . . . .”147 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
144 Id. 
145 See id. 
146 Id. at 309. 
147 Id. 
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 In approving an SEC consent judgment, the appropriate judicial standard 
of review is whether the agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate to the parties, and 
within the public interest.148  While private civil settlements are generally near 
unreviewable, where a federal agency “seeks to prospectively invoke the Court’s 
own contempt power by having the Court impose injunctive prohibitions against 
the defendant,” a higher degree of scrutiny is warranted.149  Based on his opinions 
within the Bank of America I and II decisions, and the Vitesse Semiconductor decision, 
the ultimate issue for Judge Rakoff is that while such agreements may serve the 
interests of the SEC and the corporation by making settling “easier,” it does not 
serve the interest of the public at large, particularly when the corporation, after 
settling with the SEC, proceeds to rewrite history through “equivocal press 
releases.”150  Although Judge Rakoff approved the consent judgment with Vitesse 
Semiconductor,151 and after full disclosure of the facts in Bank of America II,152 the 
result was not the same with Citigroup.153 
 The SEC’s action against Citigroup focused on a billion-dollar fund 
created by the corporation in 2007 to unload poorly rated mortgaged-backed 
securities on misinformed investors.154  The basic scheme was to hand-select a 
number of assets that were projected to negatively perform and place them in a 
portfolio that would be marketed to investors as “attractive investments 
rigorously selected by an independent investment advisor.”155  At the same time, 
Citigroup took a “short position” on these very assets it had selected and realized 
a net profit of $160 million while the investors lost more than $700 million.156  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 See SEC v. Bank of America Corp. (Bank of America I), 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
149 Id. 
150 Vitesse Semiconductor, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 309. 
151 Id. at 310 (consent judgment approved because of admissions of guilt in parallel criminal 
proceedings, thus not leaving the public to speculate about the truth of the allegations). 
152 SEC v. Bank of America Corp. (Bank of America II), 2010 WL 624581, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
153 See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
154 See id. at 329. 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  For a full discussion of the Fund at issue, see infra notes 269–74 and accompanying text. 
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a parallel complaint against Brian Stoker—the Citigroup employee who oversaw 
the structuring of these funds—the SEC alleged that:  
Citigroup knew it would be difficult to place the 
liabilities of the Fund if it disclosed to investors its 
intention to use the vehicle to short a hand-picked 
set of poorly rated assets.  By contrast, Citigroup 
knew that representing to investors that an 
experienced third-party investment adviser had 
selected the portfolio would facilitate the 
placement of the Fund’s liabilities.157 
  However, this language was absent from the Citigroup complaint and 
therefore most disconcerting to Judge Rakoff.158  Thus, while on the one hand, 
the SEC was alleging intent, or scienter, against Citigroup in the Stoker complaint, 
opening the corporation up to a host of collateral consequences discussed earlier 
in this paper, on the other hand, the SEC had only charged Citigroup with 
negligence in the Citigroup complaint.159  Even more, Citigroup would be allowed 
to settle the charges “without admitting or denying the allegations” of the 
complaint.160  This inconsistency between the two complaints, as well as the 
minimal facts made available by the SEC about Citigroup’s misconduct, was 
simply too much for Judge Rakoff and he rejected the settlement.161 
 Interestingly, unlike in Bank of America I and II and Vitesse Semiconductor, 
the SEC argued that while the settlement must be fair, reasonable, and adequate, 
it did not necessarily need to be in the public interest.162  The rationale for the 
SEC’s strategy is a mystery, but some have theorized that given Judge Rakoff’s 
oft-repeated criticisms of these agreements, the SEC felt the need to 
authoritatively establish its right to settle based on whatever terms it deems to be 
appropriate.163  Judge Rakoff responded with a bold rebuke of the SEC, rooting 
his rationale within the injunctive remedy and the associated judicial power of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Id. at 330 (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 Id. at 332. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. at 330–31. 
163 See John Coffee, Collision Course: The SEC and Judge Rakoff, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 19, 2012, available 
athttp://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202538773586/Collision-Course%3A-The-SEC-and-
Judge-Rakoff . 
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contempt being sought from the Court.164  For Judge Rakoff, the core 
consideration as to whether the court should exercise its powers to grant an 
injunctive remedy is if the remedy serves the public interest—and the ultimate 
arbiter of this determination lies within the independent judgment of the court.165  
As Judge Rakoff stated in Bank of America II and Vitesse Semiconductor, to be able to 
grant an injunctive remedy, there must be a sufficient evidentiary basis justifying 
the court to do so.166 
[W]hen a public agency asks a court to become its 
partner in enforcement by imposing wide-ranging 
injunctive remedies on a defendant, enforced by 
the formidable judicial power of contempt, the 
court, and the public, need some knowledge of 
what the underlying facts are: for otherwise, the 
court becomes a mere handmaiden to a settlement 
privately negotiated on the basis of unknown facts, 
while the public is deprived of ever knowing the 
truth in a matter of obvious public importance.167 
 In the eyes of Judge Rakoff, this absence of the facts is further 
exacerbated by the SEC permitting Citigroup to neither admit nor deny the 
underlying allegations.168  While both parties seemingly were more concerned 
about collateral consequences to Citigroup than disclosing the facts,169 Judge 
Rakoff dismissed those concerns, stating “a consent judgment between a federal 
agency and a private corporation which is not the result of an actual adjudication 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 See Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332. 
165 Id. at 331 (“[A] court, while giving substantial deference to the views of an administrative body 
vested with authority over a particular area, must still exercise a modicum of independent 
judgment in determining whether the requested deployment of its injunctive powers will serve, or 
disserve, the public interest.”). 
166 See id. at 332. 
167 Id. 
168 See id. 
169 Judge Rakoff accused Citigroup that its intentions, while not to admit the allegations, were to 
deny them in the media and parallel litigation.  Id. at 332–33.  He also accused the SEC of being 
satisfied that by Citigroup agreeing to “not expressly deny the allegations,” that somehow the 
truth had been sufficiently publicly exposed.  Id. at 333.   
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of any of the issues [cannot] be used as evidence in subsequent litigation.”170 If 
anything, in Judge Rakoff’s opinion, the settlement with the SEC was merely 
Citigroup’s cost of doing business rather than “any indication of where the real 
truth” may lie.171  Here, Citigroup—a recidivist offender—was able to settle a 
broad-ranging investigation without ever admitting to anything (thus mitigating 
collateral consequences) while also paying a modest fine and adopting certain 
relatively inexpensive prophylactic measures.172  In Judge Rakoff’s words, if the 
SEC’s allegations were true, the settlement was “a very good deal for Citigroup,” 
and even if they were false, it was “a mild and modest cost of doing business.”173 
 Limiting Citigroup’s collateral consequences was not the only party’s 
interest Judge Rakoff criticized, however.  Turning to the SEC, Judge Rakoff 
accused the regulator of seeking nothing more than a “quick headline” rather than 
acting in the investors’ best interests.174  By only charging Citigroup with 
negligence and then permitting them to settle without any admission or denial, 
the defrauded investors were dealt a “double blow,” as they cannot bring a private 
securities action based on negligence175 nor can they receive any evidentiary aid 
through collateral estoppel from Citigroup’s non-admission or non-denial.176 
 Despite his criticism, the SEC’s and Citigroup’s interests do matter to 
Judge Rakoff, but resolving those interests does not automatically mean the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Id. at 333 (quoting Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976)).   
171 Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333.  The fact that Citigroup was a recidivist offender and that the 
SEC had failed to enforce against any financial institution over the previous 10 years the very 
injunctive remedy it was seeking seemed to have made the settlement agreement particularly 
distasteful to Judge Rakoff.  See id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 333–34.  Judge Rakoff found the $285 million fine Citigroup was required to pay to be 
paltry in comparison to the total losses suffered by investors.  See id. at 334.  Additionally, the 
settlement left open whether any of the fine would be given to the defrauded investors to help 
cover their losses.  See id. 
175 Under Delaware General Business Law § 102(b)(7), a corporation may exculpate monetary 
damages for “acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a 
knowing violation of law.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2011).  As such, if the 
corporation’s articles of incorporation contain a § 102(b)(7) exculpatory clause, shareholders 
cannot base a derivative suit on gross negligence.  See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 
906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006). 
176 Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 334.  See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 
(1979) (permitting offensive collateral estoppel where shareholders used declaratory judgment 
from SEC action against corporation in a later private action). 
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public interest has been served.177  In what is probably the most important line 
from the opinion,178 Judge Rakoff writes: 
Even after giving the fullest deference to the 
S.E.C.’s views—which have more than once 
persuaded this Court to approve an S.E.C. 
Consent Judgment it found dubious on the merits 
. . . , the Court is forced to conclude that a 
proposed Consent Judgment that asks the Court 
to impose substantial injunctive relief, enforced by 
the Court’s own contempt power, on the basis of 
allegations unsupported by any proven or acknowledged facts 
whatsoever, is neither reasonable, nor fair, nor 
adequate, nor in the public interest.179 
 For Judge Rakoff, whether Citigroup actually stipulates to the allegations 
in the SEC’s complaint is not as important as the SEC presenting sufficient 
evidence to justify the use of the court’s injunctive power.180  As in Bank of 
America II and Vitesse Semiconductor, it is much easier for the court to determine 
what future conduct the injunction prevents when the facts are made plain.181  But 
where the truth is swept under the rug, it is not within the public interest to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 See Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335. 
178 Coffee, supra note 163. 
179 Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (emphasis added). 
180 See id.  (“An application of judicial power that does not rest on facts is worse than mindless, it 
is inherently dangerous.  The injunctive power of the judiciary is not a free-roving remedy to be 
invoked at the whim of a regulatory agency, even with the consent of the regulated.  If its 
deployment does not rest on facts—cold, hard, solid facts, established either by admissions or by 
trials—it serves no lawful or moral purpose and is simply an engine of oppression.”); see also 
Coffee, supra note 164 (“[T]he court is here objecting that there are no ‘acknowledged facts 
whatsoever’”). 
181 As earlier stated, after appending 48 pages in facts to the settlement agreement, Judge Rakoff 
approved the SEC’s settlement with Bank of America.  SEC v. Bank of America Corp. (Bank of 
America II), 2010 WL 624581, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  In addition, the SEC’s settlement with 
Vitesse Semiconductor was approved because of a parallel criminal proceeding in which the 
parties had admitted their guilt.  See SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 
310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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“grant judicial enforcement to the agency’s contrivances,” even if it is “in the 
name of deference or convenience.”182 
 Given the high-profile nature of the Citigroup decision, rather than 
retreating and revising the settlement agreement with Citigroup (similarly to Bank 
of America I and II), the SEC decided to appeal and motioned to stay the 
proceedings pending determination of the appeal.183  Not surprisingly, Judge 
Rakoff rejected the stay, and the SEC and Citigroup then appealed to the Second 
Circuit where the stay was granted.184  Focusing mainly on the administrative law 
issue of Judge Rakoff’s alleged lack of deference for SEC discretion in 
constructing its settlements,185 and the perception that Judge Rakoff would 
require some sort of admission by Citigroup to approve a settlement,186 the 
Second Circuit stayed the proceedings and held that the SEC and Citigroup had a 
“strong likelihood of success” in their effort to overturn Judge Rakoff’s ruling.187 
On February 8, 2013, the SEC and Citigroup argued the merits of the 
settlement agreement against John Wing, the court appointed attorney for Judge 
Rakoff.188  The essence of the SEC’s argument on appeal was that Judge Rakoff’s 
rejection of the settlement agreement conflicted with the “well-established judicial 
practice,” under administrative law principles, of granting deference to the 
judgment of federal agencies in negotiating a settlement agreement.189  According 
to the SEC, the staff weighed the risks and benefits of a trial versus a settlement 
and decided that a settlement, rather than litigation, “best served the public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335. 
183 SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 336, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
184 SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 169 (2d Cir. 2012). 
185 Id. at 165 (“[I]t is doubtful whether the court gave the obligatory deference to the S.E.C.’s 
views in deciding that the settlement was not in the public interest.”). 
186 Id. at 166 (“We know of no precedent that supports the proposition that a settlement will not 
be found to be fair, adequate, reasonable, or in the public interest unless liability has been 
conceded or proved and is embodied in the judgment.”). 
187 Id.  It should be noted that the Second Circuit only received papers from the SEC and 
Citigroup, and following the stay, counsel was appointed to represent Judge Rakoff.  See id. at 160. 
188 See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 336, 336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), appeal 
docketed, No. 11-5227 (2d Cir. 2013).  Citigroup was represented by Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton 
& Garrison LLP while the SEC was represented by their Deputy General Counsel, Michael A. 
Conley, and Solicitor, Jacob H. Stillman. See id. 
189 Brief Comm’n.,for Petitioner at 18–19, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 163 
(2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227). 
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interest.”190  The SEC interpreted Judge Rakoff’s rejection of the agreement as 
creating a “bright-line rule” that requires an admission of liability for any consent 
judgment seeking injunctive relief191 as well as interfering with the ability of the 
SEC “to manage its enforcement program and allocate its resources.”192  In 
justifying its use of “neither admit nor deny” language within its settlement 
agreements, the SEC rationalized that “many . . . defendants will not admit to 
factual allegations because they are concerned about, among other things, the 
collateral estoppel effect of admissions on parallel private actions.”193  By 
requiring an admission, the SEC’s ability to negotiate a compromise would be 
upset, thus forcing the SEC to limit the number of cases it pursues through 
district court enforcement actions.194  As such, the SEC’s enforcement program 
would not be driven by the staff’s “ability to obtain the best outcome for 
investors in the greatest number of cases given [their] resources . . . , but rather by 
a judicial imperative requiring a factual adjudication in every instance.”195   
From Citigroup’s perspective, the correct judicial standard of review to be 
applied is only whether the agreement was fair, reasonable and adequate, and any 
additional requirement that the facts upon which the settlement is based must be 
proven or acknowledged is inconsistent with federal judicial practice.196  The 
court’s role is not to second guess the federal agency on whether the settlement is 
ideal but only look to the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the 
agreement.197  By requiring an admission or proof of liability, Citigroup contends 
that Judge Rakoff overstepped his narrow judicial role in approving a negotiated 
agreement,198 thus vitiating the very reason the SEC enters into these types of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190Id. at 19. 
191 Id. at 21. 
192 Id. at 41. 
193 Id. at 47. 
194 Id. at 49.  According to the SEC’s brief, 87% of its district court cases are resolved by consent 
judgments each year.  Id. at 23.  
195 Id. at 50. 
196 See Brief of Appellee, at 15–16, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 
2012) (No. 11-5227). 
197 See id. at 29-30. 
198 See id. at 16. 
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agreements—mitigating collateral consequences to the corporation and 
conserving the precious prosecutorial resources of the SEC.199  According to 
Citigroup, what best serves the public interest is solely determined by the federal 
agency and not by the judge reviewing the settlement agreement.200  Rather than 
effecting an outcome the court would like to see, the role of the judge is only “to 
effect the terms negotiated by the parties.”201  Thus, in the eyes of Citigroup, the 
agreement with the SEC was fair, as “it reflect[ed] an agreement reached in arm’s 
length negotiations between experienced, capable counsel after meaningful 
discovery,” was reasonable and adequate because “it provide[d] for 
comprehensive relief, negotiated and agreed to by the parties after each weighed 
the significant litigation risk involved in proceeding to trial,” and served the 
public interest, “as determined by the SEC, in the appropriate exercise of its 
authority to regulate the federal securities laws.”202 
According to Judge Rakoff, the SEC and Citigroup distorted his ruling, 
and no “bright-line rule” was created requiring an admission or proof of liability 
in approving a settlement agreement.203  Rather, what Judge Rakoff was seeking 
was a full disclosure of the facts, which was not presented to him by either of the 
parties.204  In referencing two prior consent judgments, Judge Rakoff provided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 See id. at 17. 
200 Id. at 31–32.  Citigroup, in making this argument, cited to the Second Circuit’s decision 
granting a stay of the proceedings.  “The S.E.C.’s decision to settle with Citigroup was driven by 
the considerations of governmental policy as to the public interest.  The district court believed it 
was a bad policy, which disserved the public interest, for the S.E.C. to allow Citigroup to settle on 
terms that did not establish its liability.  It is not, however, the proper function of federal courts to 
dictate policy to executive administrative agencies.”  SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 
158, 163 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (“[Federal judges – who have no constituency – have a duty to respect 
legitimate policy choices made by those who do.  The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of 
such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are 
not judicial ones: Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the public branches.”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
201 Brief of Appellee, at 32–33 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
202 Id. at 3–4.  In making the argument that it is solely within the SEC’s discretion to determine 
what best serves the public interest, Citigroup also stated that the court is only to evaluate whether 
a proposed injunction on the defendant would cause harm to the public interest, not if it best 
served the public interest.  Id. at 48. 
203 See Brief of Appointed Pro Bono Counsel For The United States District Court, at 28, SEC v. 
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227). 
204 See id. at 30–31 (“Indeed, even though the SEC had conducted a four-year investigation of the 
matter, it chose not to present the court [either directly or even on an ex parte basis] with any 
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examples of what he was looking for from the SEC:  a full recitation of the facts 
upon which the settlement agreement was based, similar to the 35-page Statement 
of Facts in Bank of America, or an express acknowledgment of key facts similar to 
the admission of a mistake in Goldman Sachs.205  Here, Judge Rakoff received 
neither but found “puzzling anomalies” in the complaints filed against Citigroup 
and Brian Stoker and in the proposed consent judgment.206  In Judge Rakoff’s 
view, these inconsistencies, as well as the unique circumstances of the case, made 
the “need for injunctive relief doubtful.”207  Additionally, in light of the type of 
injunctive relief the SEC was seeking against Citigroup, a factual basis was needed 
to show that future misconduct could occur.208  Taken together, Judge Rakoff had 
no “evidentiary basis upon which to exercise [his] independent judgment” in 
approving the consent judgment and granting injunctive relief.209  It was this 
independent judgment upon which Judge Rakoff justified the district courts’ role 
in determining if a settlement agreement serves the public interest.210  Under 
Judge Rakoff’s rationale, “[t]he public interest is measured in part by the 
settlement’s ability to further the goals of the statute that the judgment is designed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
documents, deposition transcripts, or other evidence of any kind from the presumably extensive 
record collected during that investigation.”).  
205 Id. at 30.  Notably, both consent judgments contained “neither admit nor deny” language.  See 
SEC v. Bank of America Corp. (Bank of America II), 2010 WL 624581, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); SEC 
v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 2010 WL 2779309, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
206 See Brief of Appointed Pro Bono Counsel For The United States District Court, at 2, 24; see also 
supra notes 157–61 and accompanying text.  
207 See id. at 43.  The unique circumstances include a limited claim of negligence against Citigroup 
which normally does not justify imposing injunctive relief, the fact that Citigroup had 
discontinued the misconduct five years prior and had already implemented a number of remedial 
measures, that an injunction prohibiting Citigroup from violating the same statute had already 
been imposed a year earlier, and the failure of the SEC to enforce any of its previously entered 
injunctions against Citigroup or any other major financial institution within the previous ten years.  
See id. 
208 See id. at 40 (“Here, the requirement was made even more acute by the fact that the proposed 
consent judgment sought not only an extremely broad [“obey-the-law”] prohibiting injunction but 
also a variety of mandatory injunctions in the form of prophylactic measures Citigroup was 
ordered to implement.”).  
209 Id. at 27, 33. 
210 Id. at 46. 
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to enforce.”211  In his opinion, the proposed consent judgment had serious 
shortcomings in preventing securities fraud.212  As such, Judge Rakoff’s rejection 
of the agreement was not a case of him substituting his views for that of the SEC 
in what the settlement should have contained.213  Contrary to the SEC’s claims, 
trial was not the only option; the parties could also return to the table, similarly to 
Bank of America I and II, and renegotiate a deal that would pass judicial muster—
namely the presentment of facts upon which the settlement was based.214  
Ultimately for Judge Rakoff, the district court’s role in determining whether a 
settlement agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate is more than just serving as 
a “rubber stamp” or “potted plant.”215 
While the Second Circuit has not issued its decision yet, there have been 
two notable consequences as a result of the Citigroup settlement controversy.  
First, the SEC made a change in policy in which it would no longer allow 
defendants to neither admit nor deny allegations in a settlement agreement where 
there is a parallel criminal prosecution.216  Second, public debate has increased 
about whether the SEC’s use of “neither admit nor deny” language “allows 
defendants to avoid accepting responsibility for their conduct.”217   
On the heels of the Citigroup decision, Robert Khuzami stated that the 
SEC’s change in policy regarding the use of “neither admit nor deny” language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Id. at 47. 
212 Id.  Judge Rakoff took exception to the monetary penalty imposed on Citigroup, which he 
found to be inadequate due to how it was calculated by the SEC; the discrepancy between the 
Citigroup penalty of $95 million and an earlier Goldman Sachs penalty of $535 million for virtually 
identical conduct; and the lack of restitution to injured investors.  See id. at 49–52. 
213 See id. at 53. 
214 See id. 
215 See id. at 54–55.  The Brief for the U.S. District Court goes to great lengths to address the 
SEC’s and Citigroup’s definition of judicial deference to a federal agency.  In Judge Rakoff’s view, 
“deference [does not] mean that courts mechanistically and mindlessly apply some formulaic 
standard.  Rather, deference must be considered in the context of the particular demands of any 
given case . . . .”  Id. at 56. 
216 See Khuzami, supra note 14. 
217 Reckler & Denton, supra note 15, at 2. See Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. is Avoiding Tough Sanctions for 
Large Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/business/sec-is-avoiding-tough-sanctions-for-large-
banks.html?pagewanted=all (reporting that over the previous ten years the SEC had granted 350 
waivers to financial institutions that had existing injunctions against them not to commit securities 
fraud again). 
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was unrelated to Judge Rakoff’s ruling.218  Nonetheless, the correlation is 
significant, though the actual number of instances in which there is a parallel 
criminal prosecution is relatively few.219  In those cases, the SEC will delete the 
“neither admit nor deny” language from the settlement agreement, recite the “fact 
and nature” of the criminal conviction or DPA or NPA within the SEC 
settlement, and permit the staff the discretion to incorporate any relevant facts 
admitted to within the criminal conviction or DPA or NPA into the settlement 
documents.220  Additionally, defendants will not be permitted to deny the 
allegations of the complaint or make statements suggesting the allegations are 
without a factual basis.221 
Following this announcement, Khuzami was summoned to testify on the 
settlement practices of the SEC before the Committee on Financial Services of 
the U.S. House of Representatives on May 17, 2012.222  In justifying the use of 
“neither admit nor deny” within SEC settlement agreements, Khuzami testified 
that the SEC weighs three considerations when contemplating a settlement: “(i) 
the strength of the evidence and the potential defenses, including the possibility 
that the Commission might not prevail at trial, or prevail but be awarded less than 
the proposed settlement achieves; (ii) the delay in returning funds to harmed 
investors caused by litigation; and (iii) the resources required for a trial, including, 
most importantly, the opportunity costs of litigating rather than devoting those 
resources to investigating other cases.”223  These considerations serve the 
important goals of settlements: accountability, deterrence, investor protection, 
and compensation to harmed investors.224  Settlements hold defendants 
accountable by publically disseminating information about their misconduct, 
promote deterrence, protect investors by offering immediate sanctions that will 
prevent future misconduct, which minimizes the chance that other investors will 
be victimized, and return funds to harmed investors with greater speed and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Khuzami, supra note 14. 
219 See id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Khuzami, supra note 15. 
223 Id. 
224 See id. 
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certainty than through a trial.225  “Neither admit nor deny” language is often seen 
as the key to reaching these settlements: 
There is little dispute that if “neither-admit-nor-
deny” settlements were eliminated, and cases could 
be resolved only if the defendant admitted the 
facts constituting the violation, or was found liable 
by a court or jury, there would be far fewer 
settlements, and much greater delay in resolving 
matters and bringing relief to harmed investors.  
The reality is that many companies likely would refuse to 
settle cases if they were required to affirmatively admit 
unlawful conduct or facts related to that conduct.  This is 
because such admissions would not only expose 
them to additional lawsuits by private litigants 
seeking damages, but would also risk a “collateral 
estoppel” effect in such lawsuits.  This means that 
a defendant could, as a result of the admission in 
the SEC settlement, be precluded from challenging 
liability in the private civil litigation.  In addition, 
and most significantly, such an admission can help 
to establish elements of criminal liability, since 
many federal securities laws provide for both civil 
and criminal liability for the same violation.  At a 
minimum, the risks of increased civil and criminal 
liability that flow from an admission in an SEC 
action are sufficiently real that defendants are 
highly unlikely to settle, if at all, until those risks 
have passed or are quantified and deemed 
acceptable.226 
In the SEC’s view, requiring admissions as a condition of settlement would likely 
result in delays to victim compensation, postponement of sanctions, and 
significant expenditure of SEC resources that could be used to prevent future 
fraud.227  While, admittedly, this approach means “some measure of . . . 
compromise . . . [it] is [intended] to redress wrongs committed by securities law 
violators, preclude wrongdoers from working with the investing public in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 See id. 
226 Id. (emphasis added). 
227 See id. 
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future, reform company practices, deter similar misconduct by others, and return 
funds directly to harmed investors in a timely manner.”228 
 Public sentiment to this change in policy has been mixed.229  Some see 
that the policy change will have little to no effect at all on how the SEC settles its 
cases.230  In December 2011, just prior to the SEC’s announcement, Khuzami 
publicly stated that he believed that the SEC rejecting a “reasonable settlement 
due to the absence of an admission” was an “unwise policy.”231  Luis A. Aguilar, 
an SEC commissioner, also publicly stated that the policy change “applies in so 
few situations, it needs to be revised to be more useful and effective.”232  
Statements like these, as well as Khuzami’s testimony before Congress, tend to 
show that there is little change expected.  Others, however, see the policy change 
as having some ramifications for defendants in how settlements are negotiated 
with the SEC.233  Obviously, a defendant facing a criminal charge has collateral 
estoppel concerns, but it is important to note that not all SEC cases overlap 
perfectly with the criminal case.234  Accordingly, a criminal conviction or guilty 
plea may not necessarily provide a shareholder or investor with the relevant 
scienter needed to prove fraud in a private action.235  Additionally, under Second 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Id.  
229 See Wyatt, supra note 12 (“Securities law experts differed over the practical importance of the 
change, with some saying it is a notable acknowledgment by the agency of flaws in its system, and 
others suggesting that it will not affect most S.E.C. cases, which involve only civil charges.”). 
230 See Reckler & Denton, supra note 15, at4-5  (“[U]ntil such time as more courts and critics join 
Judge Rakoff in questioning settlements that do not include admissions, the SEC can be expected 
to continue including ‘neither admit nor deny’ language in settlements that do not involve 
admissions in parallel criminal cases.”). 
231 Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Remarks Before the 
Consumer Federation of America’s Financial Services Conference (Dec. 1, 2011). 
232 Edward Wyatt, Settlements Without Admissions Get Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/business/neither-admit-nor-deny-settlements-draw-
judges-scrutiny.html?_r=0. 
233 See Mei Lin Kwan-Gett, Alison Levine & Erin McLeod, Assessing the SEC’s New ‘Neither Admit 
Nor Deny’ Policy, N.Y. L. J., Oct. 2012, at 1 (reporting that from January 2012 through August 
2012, in 27 of 29 consent judgments where there was a parallel criminal case, the SEC omitted 
“neither admit nor deny” language from the settlement document). 
234 See id. at 3. 
235 Id. 
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Circuit case law, a settlement agreement does not have a collateral estoppel effect 
on subsequent private litigation because the issues were never actually litigated.236  
As such, it still behooves a defendant to negotiate expeditiously with the SEC—
even when there is a parallel criminal proceeding—to limit their exposure to 
collateral consequences.237 
Public criticism of “neither admit nor deny” has also been sharp from 
other federal district judges who have rejected or seriously questioned federal 
regulators’ settlements containing such language.238  In 2010, Judge Ellen Segal 
Huvelle of the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia rejected a 
proposed settlement agreement between the SEC and Citigroup only to later 
approve it after the parties brought sufficient evidence to show why the 
settlement was adequate and why the SEC had only charged two executives with 
wrongdoing.239 
In December 2010, on the heels of the Citigroup decision, Judge Rudolph 
Randa of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, through a letter to the SEC, 
questioned whether the settlement agreement between the SEC and Koss 
Corporation was fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest considering 
the lack of factual evidence justifying the injunctive and disgorgement remedies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“As a 
matter of law, an allegation that is neither admitted nor denied is simply that, an allegation.  It has 
no evidentiary value and no collateral estoppel effect.”). See also Lipsky v. Commonwealth United 
Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[A] consent judgment between a federal agency and a 
private corporation which is not the result of an actual adjudication of any of the issues . . . can 
not be used as evidence in subsequent litigation.”). 
237 See Kwan-Gett, supra note 233, at 4 (reporting that “cooperation with the government appears 
to yield gentler treatment” regarding admissions in a settlement agreement). 
238 Federal district judges are not the only ones critical of regulators’ use of settlement agreements 
with financial institutions.  In a recent Senate Banking Committee hearing, Senator Elizabeth 
Warren of Massachusetts grilled financial regulators for failing to prosecute Wall Street banks.  
After regulators failed to adequately respond to her question of when was the last time regulators 
had taken a Wall Street bank to trial, Sen. Warren stated, “I’m really concerned ‘too big to fail’ has 
become ‘too big for trial.’  That just seems wrong to me.”  David Uberti, Senator Elizabeth Warren 
Grills Regulators, Ending Quiet First Month in Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 2013, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/2013/02/14/senator-elizabeth-warren-grills-regulators-
ending-quiet-first-month-office/rEHdymDsEVcT5yW52LD93M/story.html.  
239 Edward Wyatt, Judge Accepts Citigroup’s Settlement with S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/business/25sec.html.  In rejecting the initial settlement, 
Judge Huvelle stated to the parties, “I look at this and say, ‘Why would I find this reasonable?’  
You expect the court to rubber stamp, but we can’t.”  See also Kara Scannell, Judge Won’t Approve 
Citi-SEC Pact, WALL ST.  J. (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704868604575433833841630548.html. 
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sought.240  Judge Randa later approved the settlement after the parties provided 
sufficient evidence to justify the agreement.241   
In September 2012, Judge Renee Marie Bumb of the District of New 
Jersey accepted a settlement agreement between the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and Circa Direct LLC after initially rejecting it over concerns the 
corporation had not admitted liability and that there was not enough factual 
evidence to justify an injunctive remedy.242  In considering the revised settlement, 
Judge Bumb took a moment to discuss whether the corporation’s lack of 
admission should be considered within the public interest analysis.243  In holding 
that it does, Judge Bumb repeated Judge Rakoff’s justification for greater judicial 
scrutiny of these settlement agreements: “Because the consent decree does not 
merely validate a compromise but, by virtue of its injunctive provisions, reaches 
into the future and has continuing effect, its terms require more careful 
scrutiny.”244  For Judge Bumb, the core of the settlement was in airing the facts so 
that “the public [may] have some mechanism to evaluate the truth of the . . . 
claims.”245  While the final settlement agreement did not contain an admission of 
liability by Circa Direct, Judge Bumb conditioned her approval of the settlement 
on the FTC publishing the settlement and the alleged facts on the internet so that 
the truth would be made known.246   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Letter from Hon. Rudolph T. Randa, U.S. District Judge, E.D. Wisc., to Ms. Andrea R. Wood 
& Mr. James A. Davidson, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 20, 2011), (available at 
http://www.fedseclaw.com/uploads/file/2011%2012%2020%20Letter%20Order%20from%20C
ourt%281%29.pdf). 
241 See SEC v. Koss Corp., Litigation Release No. 22138, No. 2:11-cv-00991 (Oct. 24, 2011). 
242 See F.T.C. v. Circa Direct LLC, 2012 WL 3987610 (D. N.J. 2012). 
243 See id. at *4. 
244 Id. (quotation omitted)) see SEC v. Bank of America Corp. (Bank of America I), 653 F. Supp. 2d 
507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“When, however, as in the case of a typical consent judgment, a federal 
agency such as the S.E.C. seeks to prospectively invoke the Court’s own contempt power by 
having the Court impose injunctive prohibitions against the defendant, the resolution has aspects 
of a judicial decree and the Court is therefore obliged to review the proposal a little more closely . 
. . .”). 
245 Circa Direct, 2012 WL 3987610, at *6, n. 3. 
246 See id. at *7. 
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In June 2012, Judge Frederic Block of the Eastern District of New York 
approved the SEC’s settlement with two former Bear Stearns fund managers 
while refusing to extend Judge Rakoff’s and Judge Bumb’s public interest analysis 
of a settlement agreement.247  Disagreeing with Judge Rakoff, Judge Block only 
inquired into whether the agreement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, relying 
on the fact that “the settlement is the product of arm’s length negotiation 
between sophisticated parties with capable counsel and adequate knowledge of 
the facts adduced in discovery . . . .”248  Further, Judge Block deferred to the 
SEC’s judgment that the settlement was in the public interest, even though he had 
earlier characterized the monetary penalty the defendants were required to pay as 
“chump change.”249  Nonetheless, prior to approving the agreement, Judge Block 
expressed serious misgivings regarding the judge’s role in approving the 
settlement, questioning the SEC as to whether he was expected to just “rubber 
stamp” the agreement.250 
In January 2013, in a curt, one-paragraph opinion, Judge John L. Kane of 
the District of Colorado rejected the SEC’s settlement with Bridge Premium 
Finance, stating two reasons: first, the defendants’ defiant muteness as to the 
truth of the allegations against them, and second, the defendants’ waiver of their 
right to the entry of a finding of fact and conclusion of law.251 
Finally, in March 2013, Judge Victor Marrero of the Southern District of 
New York expressed skepticism over the SEC’s proposed settlement agreement 
with SAC Capital Advisors (SAC) for insider trading allegations.252  Focusing 
specifically on the SEC’s use of “neither admit nor deny” language within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 See SEC v. Cioffi, 868 F. Supp. 2d 65, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
248 Id. at 74. 
249 See id. at 66, 74.  The defendants in the case were required to pay the SEC $800,000 and 
$250,000, respectively, and investor losses due to their misconduct were $1.6 billion.  Id. at 66. 
250 See Alison Frankel, Judge in SEC’s Bear Stearns case catches Rakoff fever, THOMPSON REUTERS 
NEWS & INSIGHT (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/02_-
_February/Judge_in_SEC_s_Bear_Stearns_case_catches_Rakoff_fever/  (quoting Judge Block, 
“Am I just a rubber stamp here or is there some inquiry I ought to be making about these 
provisions?  About the fairness of it?  Or the reasonableness of it?  I'm not so sure I necessarily 
agree with everything Judge Rakoff wrote, but what should be the judge's role when the judge is 
being asked to consent to one of these types of things?”). 
251 SEC v. Bridge Premium Finance, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-02131-JLK-BNB, slip op. at 1 (D. Colo. 
Jan. 17, 2013) (“A defendant’s options in this regard are binary: he may admit the allegation or he 
may go to trial.”). 
252 See Lattman, supra note 1.  
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settlement, Judge Marrero stated, “There is something counterintuitive and 
incongruous about settling for $600 million if [SAC] truly did nothing wrong.”253  
When asked why SAC was willing to pay $600 million to settle the case rather 
than $1 million in legal fees to defend itself, SAC responded, “We’re willing to 
pay $600 million because we have a business to run and don’t want this hanging 
over our heads with litigation that could last for years.”254  Turning to the SEC, 
Judge Marrero expressed concerns about the inconsistencies between the DOJ’s 
pending criminal case against a former SAC portfolio manager, Mathew 
Martoma—who had pleaded not guilty to related criminal charges—and the 
SEC’s case against SAC.255  “How would it look if in the settlement before it, the 
parties were allowed to say[,] ‘We did nothing wrong?’ [Judge] Marrero asked.”256  
While Judge Marrero has not yet ruled on the settlement agreement, he hinted 
that he may condition approval on the outcome of the Second Circuit Citigroup 
appeal.257  The SEC argued that the court is free to approve the agreement 
without considering the Citigroup appeal because “[the SEC] do[es] not see the no-
admit, no-deny language as an unsettled question.”258  However, that is not the 
case for Judge Marrero, who sees himself in the same position as Judge Rakoff in 
the Citigroup settlement.259  “The ground is shaking, let’s admit that, said [Judge] 
Marrero.” 260 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Id.  
254 Id.  What is notable about SAC’s response is that it echoes Judge Rakoff’s accusation in 
Citigroup that Citigroup’s settling of the SEC’s case against it was merely one of the costs of doing 
business.  See supra notes 168–73 and accompanying text. 
255 See Lattman, supra note 1.  Prosecutors allege that Mr. Martoma shared insider information with 
Steven A. Cohen, the head of SAC, regarding Alzheimer’s drugs produced by Elan Corp. and 
Wyeth LLC.  As a result, SAC was able to make $276 million in illegal profit and in losses avoided 
on shares of the two corporations.  See id. 
256 Bob Van Voris, SAC Judge Questions Record $602 Million SEC Settlement, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 28, 
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-28/sac-judge-questions-record-602-million-
sec-settlement.html. 
257 See Lattman, supra note 1. 
258 Van Voris, supra note 256. 
259 See id. 
260 Id. 
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How the Second Circuit will rule on the Citigroup appeal is yet to be 
determined.  However, it appears that there are at least four ways the court could 
go.261  First, the court could agree with Judge Rakoff’s complaint that the SEC 
does not need to bring each and every settlement into federal district court, 
especially after considering the fact that the SEC never seems to invoke the 
injunctive power it consistently seeks as part of these settlements.262  If this is the 
case, the SEC’suse of DPAs and NPAs will (likely) dramatically increase in 
situationswhere injunctive remedies are not typically part of the agreement and 
judicial review is limited or not at all required.  Second, the court could agree with 
Judge Rakoff and Judge Bumb that the federal district courts are to exercise their 
independent judgment in approving a settlement agreement and that approval is 
not a mere “rubber stamp” to whatever the SEC can negotiate.263  If this were to 
happen, Professor Coffee suggests that a consent judgment does not necessarily 
have to require a defendant to accept collateral estoppel by admitting to the 
enforcement agency’s allegations.264  However, if “neither admit nor deny” 
language is used, the district court should seek a full explanation as to the 
enforcement agency’s rationale, and the court should have some factual 
understanding of the strength of the enforcement agency’s case prior to imposing 
injunctive relief.265  Additionally, a consent judgment should give the public some 
reliable information about what actually occurred.266  If the Second Circuit ruled 
this way, use of DPAs and NPAs could dramatically increase as closer scrutiny by 
the courts could likely yield more exacting terms and/or admissions from 
defendants—and hence greater exposure to collateral consequences.  Third, if the 
court does hold that it was proper for federal district judges to exercise their 
independent judgment in reviewing the settlement agreement, the court could 
then give some constructive guidelines as to how settlements should be 
reviewed.267  Finally, the court could hold in favor of the SEC and rule that Judge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 C. Evan Stewart, A Tale of Two Judges, 16 N.Y. BUS. L. J. 21, 23 (2012).  
262 See id. See also Brief of Appointed Pro Bono Counsel For The United States District Court, at 
43, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227).. See also 
Wyatt, supra note 215. 
263 Stewart, supra note 261, at 21. See Brief of Appointed Pro Bono Counsel For The United States 
District Court, at 54. 
264 Coffee, supra note 163. 
265 See id. 
266 Id. 
267 Stewart, supra note 261, at 21.  An interesting proposition would be for the federal district court 
to exercise its own independent judgment in approving a settlement agreement, similarly to the 
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Rakoff overstepped his bounds by rejecting the agreement and not deferring to 
the SEC’s judgment that the proposed settlement best served the public 
interest.268  In this final scenario, status quo will likely be maintained, though the 
SEC will continue to have DPAs and NPAs available in those circumstances 
where deemed necessary. 
Regardless of how the Second Circuit rules on the SEC/Citigroup appeal, 
the SEC will still maintain its ability to effectively settle the majority of these cases 
with the corporation “neither admitting nor denying” the allegations of 
misconduct.  Precisely because DPAs and NPAs remain outside the scrutiny of 
the judiciary, any “reform” that may be seen via Citigroup is questionable.  To 
advance real reform, a broader definition of “public interest” must be used by the 
courts to determine whether these settlement agreements are fair, reasonable, 
adequate, and serve the public interest. 
III. EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF “PUBLIC INTEREST” 
 Upon rejecting the Citigroup agreement, Judge Rakoff consolidated the 
SEC’s case against Citigroup with the case against Brian Stoker and set the trial 
date for July 16, 2012.269  Brian Stoker was a former mid-level executive at 
Citigroup and was the lead structurer (or “deal manager”) of the synthetic 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) called “Class V Funding III” (the Fund).270  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
judicial inquiry of the independence and good faith of corporate special litigation committees 
under Delaware law.  See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 1981).  In those 
cases, the court applies a two step inquiry: first into the independence and good faith of the 
special litigation committee, and second, “applying its own independent business judgment,” 
whether a motion to dismiss by the corporation should be granted.  Id.  
268 Stewart, supra note 261, at 21; see also Brief for Petitioner at 18–19, SEC v. Citigroup Global 
Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227). 
269 SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
270 SEC v. Stoker, 873 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  “CDOs are debt securities 
collateralized by fixed income obligations, such as residential mortgage-backed securities.  A CDO 
collateralized by other CDOs is called a ‘CDO squared.’  One such CDO squared portfolio was a 
fund called ‘Class V III’ (the ‘Fund’).  Under the terms of the Fund and similar instruments, a 
‘protection buyer’ makes periodic premium payments to a ‘protection seller.’  In return, the 
protection seller agrees to pay the protection buyer if the CDO experiences a default.  Piercing 
through the jargon, the protection seller is effectively taking a long position on the CDO, while 
the protection buyer is effectively taking a short position.”  Id. at 607 (quotation omitted). 
418 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15 
 
The Fund was structured to execute a proprietary trade271 where Citigroup 
selected 25 CDOs—forecasted by Citigroup to default—to be included within the 
Fund272 and then purchased $500 million273 of default protection on those 
assets.274  The SEC alleged that Stoker and Citigroup, either intentionally or 
negligently:  
design[ed] a Fund to take advantage of the 
potential for a falling housing market, chose assets 
for inclusion in the Fund based at least in part on 
the fact that some market participants thought 
they would fail, and took a $500 million naked 
short position on those assets, all without 
disclosing that Citigroup 1) had designed the Fund 
as a proprietary trade, 2) chose certain assets, and 
3) took a $500 million naked short position on 
only those assets.275   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 “A proprietary trade is a trade undertaken for a firm’s own account, rather than on behalf of 
the firm’s customers.” Id. at 608, n. 2 (quotation omitted). 
272 According to court records, Donald Quintin, the Managing Director of Citigroup’s CDO 
secondary trading desk, sent Stoker a list of 21 assets on which he wished to purchase protection.  
Twelve of those assets were Constellations CDOs (named after constellations), a group of assets 
which had received significant interest from hedge funds who were seeking to purchase default 
protection on those assets (i.e. “short the asset”). Stoker forwarded the list of CDOs to Sohail 
Khan, the sales person at Citigroup, who then sent them to Credit Suisse Alternative Capital 
(CSAC), the collateral fund manager, who accepted all 25 assets into the Fund.  Citigroup chose to 
engage CSAC as the collateral manager because it knew that it would be difficult to facilitate the 
transaction unless investors believed the assets in the Fund were selected by an experienced, third-
party.  Id. at 607–09. 
273 Citigroup initially took a $250 million short position on the 25 assets but later increased it to 
$500 million.  Id. at 609-10.  
274 In addition to the 25 assets Citigroup had selected for the Fund, Citigroup also took a short 
position on an additional 24 assets, which it had not selected.  Prior to the Fund closing, Citigroup 
sold its position in these 24 additional assets, as is common practice by the intermediary bank, but 
retained its short position on the 25 assets it had chosen for the Fund.  See id. at 609.   
275 Id. at 615.  A naked short position is one in which the investor has only purchased default 
protection on the asset and does not maintain an offsetting long position.  By doing this, 
Citigroup positions itself to realize profits in the event that the CDOs in the Fund went into 
default.  See Complaint, at 10, SEC v. Stoker, 2011 WL 4965844 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-CV-
7388). 
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After a two-week jury trial, Stoker was found not guilty of the SEC’s 
charges.276  At trial, Stoker’s attorney, John W. Keker, portrayed Stoker as a 
scapegoat for Citigroup’s wrongdoings, merely doing the bidding of his bosses.277  
“It’s not the bank or the transaction that’s on trial here,” Mr. Keker said in his 
closing argument, “It’s Brian Stoker.”278  Mr. Keker succeeded in showing that 
there were multiple parties who were involved in structuring the Fund and 
marketing it to investors, including other Citigroup employees at the structuring 
desk, in-house and external counsel for Citigroup, CSAC employees, and in-house 
and external counsel for CSAC.279  In casting Stoker as merely one of many in 
Citigroup’s immense CDO universe, Mr. Keker argued that his client “shouldn’t 
be blamed for the faults of banking any more than a person who works in a 
lawful casino should be blamed for the faults of gambling.”280  The jury was 
convinced by Mr. Keker’s argument.  After the verdict, Travis Dawson, one of 
the jurors, stated to reporters, “I’m not saying that Stoker was 100 percent 
innocent, but given the crazy environment back then it was hard to pin the blame 
on one person. . . .  Stoker structured a deal that his bosses told him to structure, 
so why didn’t they go after the higher-ups rather than a fall guy?”281  Beau 
Brendler, the jury’s foreman, also stated after trial, “I wanted to know why the 
bank’s C.E.O. wasn’t on trial. . . .  Citigroup’s behavior was appalling.”282 
The most fascinating aspect is what accompanied the jury verdict.  
Wrapped around the verdict form was a yellow sheet ripped from a legal pad that 
stated, “This verdict should not deter the S.E.C. from continuing to investigate 
the financial industry, review current regulations and modify existing regulations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Stoker, Litigation Release No. 22541, SEC v. Stoker, No. 11-CV-7388 (Nov. 12, 2012). 
277 See Peter Lattman, Former Citigroup Manager Cleared in Mortgage Securities Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 31, 
2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/former-citigroup-manager-cleared-in-
mortgage-securities-case/. 
278 Id. (quotation omitted). 
279 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Brian H. Stoker’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, at 8, SEC v. Stoker, 2012 WL 2126159 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-CV-7388). 
280 Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 
2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/s-e-c-gets-encouragement-from-jury-that-
ruled-against-it/. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
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as necessary.”283  Mr. Brendler, who wrote the statement, explained the rationale 
behind it:  
We were afraid that we would send a message to 
Wall Street that a jury made up regular American 
folks could not understand their complicated 
transactions and so they could get away with their 
outrageous conduct. . . .  We also did not want to 
discourage the government from investigating and 
prosecuting financial crimes.284 
The jury verdict in the Stoker trial illustrates that there is more to the 
public interest that needs to be considered by the SEC than just the investors.  
The mission of the SEC is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”285  However, the financial 
crisis—of which the Citigroup case was a contributing factor—shows that there are 
more victims than just the sophisticated institutional investors who made bad 
investment decisions.286  Perhaps Mr. Brendler best states the public’s sentiments 
when he says, “Wall Street’s actions hurt all of us and we badly need a watchdog 
who will rein them in.”287 
Certainly public outcry to punish corporations and their executives has 
been thunderous— particularly in light of the recent financial crisis288—and while 
the idea of punishing a legal fiction may seem appealing to most of the public,289 
one only has to look to the specter of Arthur Andersen to remember the 
consequences at stake.  As mentioned earlier, legal scholarship has begun to 
question the efficacy of criminally prosecuting a corporation, and the increased 
use of DPAs and NPAs—with the requisite imposition of compliance and/or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Id. (quotation omitted). 
284 Id.   
285 About The SEC, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
286 Two of the investors who suffered losses as a result of the Citigroup fund were bond insurer 
Ambec Financial Group and Koch Global Capital, an investment vehicle owned by the billionaire 
Koch brothers.  See Lattman, supra note 277. 
287 Id. at 280.  Mr. Brendler, who lives in Patterson, N.Y. was laid off in 2009 and at the time of 
the trial was still looking for full-time work.  Id. 
288 See Protess & Scott, supra note 23 (“[T]he public is still simmering over the dearth of 
prosecutions of prominent executives involved in the mortgage crisis.”). 
289 See Lattman, supra note 280 (“[Americans] still would be delighted to see the government hold 
these banks and some of their executives accountable for misconduct during the financial crisis.”). 
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monitoring programs—has gone a long way to mitigate collateral consequences 
while ensuring “model” corporate conduct.290  Despite these new tools—which, 
according to DOJ and SEC officials, have been effective in rooting out, 
punishing, and remediating corporate misconduct—the public outcry for 
retribution in the wake of scandal and economic crisis remains palpable.291  Given 
the SEC’s role in law enforcement is that of a regulator and not of a criminal 
prosecutor, there are inherent limitations on what the SEC can attain through its 
prosecutions.292  As such, when it comes to holding corporations accountable for 
their wrongdoing, “the SEC will always be weaker than other punishers, 
regardless of how aggressive its enforcement agents sound in newspaper 
interviews.”293 
That does not by any means diminish the SEC’s role, however.  Unlike 
criminal prosecutors, some laws the SEC enforces do not require the element of 
scienter.294  Thus, when financial institutions and/or their employees commit a 
wrongdoing where scienter cannot be proven, it is the SEC’s responsibility to 
hold those entities responsible before the public.  However, given the increasing 
use of settlements agreements and the comparatively few cases where a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 See Alschuler, supra note 57, at 1359 (arguing that imposing an appropriate compliance and 
internal monitoring program is a more appropriate means of corporate punishment than 
indictment and conviction); Hasnas, supra note 26, at 1356 (proposing a requirement that for a 
corporate conviction, prosecutors must establish that an effective compliance and monitoring 
program was not in place at the time of misconduct). 
291 See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B. U. L. REV. 577, 627 (2012) (noting that the 
general public has shown an increased desire to hold corporations accountable for the harms they 
have caused, and when corporate crises and losses arise, demands for punishment follow). 
292 See id. at 623 (observing that even though the SEC has recently taken a “retributive turn. . . . 
[Its] punitive bite is limited substantially by its inability to initiate criminal charges”). 
293 Id. 
294 See SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The same elements required 
to establish a section 10(b) violation and a Rule 10b–5 violation suffice to establish a violation 
under sections 17(a)(1)-(3) of the ′33 Act, with the exception that scienter is not required for the 
SEC to enjoin violations under subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3).  The statutory language of section 17(a) 
is broad and bars any person in the offer of sale of any securities from directly or indirectly 
employing any device, scheme or artifice to defraud.”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1)). See also 
Complaint, at 25, SEC v. Stoker, 2011 WL 4965844 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-CV-7388) (showing 
how the SEC’s case against Brian Stoker was a charge of negligence under Sections 17(a)(2) and 
(3) of the Securities Act).  ). 
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corporation was taken to trial—as well as the corresponding use of “neither admit 
nor deny” within those agreements—the verdict statement in the Stoker trial 
shows the public sentiment for something, anything, to be done.  While criminal 
remedies such as jail time may not be appropriate, public sentiment is that large 
corporations can easily pay a fine, install a monitoring system, and go on their 
merry way.295  And while some see the imposition of a monitoring system to be 
particularly onerous,296 the measures imposed on Citigroup did not seem to 
change Judge Rakoff’s or the jurors’ sentiments regarding the SEC’s perceived 
failure to hold Citigroup responsible.297  Extrapolating from Judge Rakoff’s and 
the jurors’ statements, sometimes, in the public eye, more than just a “slap on the 
wrist” is required for the SEC to effectively hold corporate wrongdoers 
accountable.  When necessary, an “admission” or apology is appropriate. 
Before discussing possible options for the SEC, it will help to first 
consider why an admission or apology may be appropriate when settling an 
enforcement action with a corporation.  As a way to illustrate, the “admission” of 
Lance Armstrong serves as an example.  Lance Armstrong was a seven-time Tour 
De France champion and an American icon.298  A cancer survivor, Armstrong 
came back from the brink of death to dominate the sport of cycling for close to a 
decade and inspire hope in the hearts of cancer patients, survivors, and their 
families..299  Despite Armstrong’s incredible success, he was dogged by allegations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 See Scott Lemieux, Justice, Deferred, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://prospect.org/article/justice-deferred-0 (“DPAs often allow companies to get away with 
relatively light penalties, don’t provide sufficient disincentives against future lawbreaking, and 
cause crucial facts to remain hidden from public sight.”). 
296 See Copland, supra note 41, at 12 (“[P]rosecutors—well versed in corporate compliance but less 
so in economics—may be imposing social costs, through DPAs and NPAs, that go well beyond 
the clear negative impact that such arrangements have on a company’s shareholders and 
employees.”). 
297 See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Citigroup 
was able, without admitting anything, to negotiate a settlement that (a) charges it only with 
negligence, (b) results in a very modest penalty, (c) imposes the kind of injunctive relief that 
Citigroup (a recidivist) knew that the S.E.C. had not sought to enforce against any financial 
institution for at least the last 10 years, . . . and (d) imposes relatively inexpensive prophylactic 
measures for the next three years.”). 
298 See Juliet Macur, Armstrong Drops Fight Against Doping Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/sports/cycling/lance-armstrong-ends-fight-
against-doping-charges-losing-his-7-tour-de-france-titles.html?pagewanted=all. 
299 See Richard Sandomir, Backing, Not Backing Away From, Armstrong, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/sports/cycling/lance-armstrong-retains-
support-of-nike-and-other-companies.html. 
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of blood doping and use of performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs).300  Passing 
hundreds, if not thousands of drug tests, Armstrong vehemently maintained his 
innocence while some of his closest competitors were found to have used 
PEDs.301  Seemingly indestructible, Armstrong aggressively pursued those who 
sought to legitimately question his reputation, at times suing them in private 
actions for libel or even abusively smearing their character in public.302  One of 
these people was Betsy Andreu, the wife of Armstrong’s former teammate and 
friend, Frankie Andreu.303  Mrs. Andreu and her husband reportedly witnessed 
Armstrong, who at the time had just been diagnosed with cancer, admit to 
doctors at an Indiana hospital in 1996 that he had used a number of PEDs.304  In 
the years that followed, as Armstrong maintained his innocence in the face of 
multiple doping allegations, Mrs. Andreu refused to take the code of silence 
Armstrong expected from his teammates and others associated with his cycling 
career.305  Armstrong then launched a bitter attack against Mrs. Andreu, 
questioning both her sanity and assassinating her character.306  As a result, Mr. and 
Mrs. Andreu experienced severe ostracizing from the cycling community, 
including Mr. Andreu’s firing from Armstrong’s team for refusing to dope.307  In 
the years to come, it became increasingly apparent to Armstrong that he could 
not maintain his innocence forever, and Armstrong agreed to a “tell-all” interview 
with Oprah Winfrey in January 2013.308  In the interview Ms. Winfrey specifically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Macur, supra note 298. 
301 See id. 
302 Michael McCann, Armstrong’s Confession to Have Stark, Wide-Reaching Impact, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 18, 2013,)available at 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/news/20130118/lance-armstrong-legal-implications/. 
303 See Austin Murphy, Betsy Andreu Always Knew That Lance Armstrong Doped, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
Jan. 17, 2013, available athttp://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/news/20130117/betsy-andreu-
lance-armstrong/. 
304 Juliet Macur, Confession Falls Several Words Short of Closure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2013, available 
athttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/sports/cycling/in-armstrong-interview-no-closure-for-
andreus.html?pagewanted=1. 
305 Murphy, supra note 303. 
306 Id. 
307 See id. 
308 Macur, supra note 304. 
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asked about Armstrong’s relationship with Mr. and Mrs. Andreu and a recent 
phone call he had had with the couple.309  Armstrong responded that he had not 
made peace with them, pausing before saying it's because “they've been hurt too 
badly.”310  Armstrong then elaborated on one part of the phone call with Mrs. 
Andreu, recalling, “I said listen, I called you crazy.  I called you a bitch.  I called 
you all these things.  But I never called you fat.”311   
During Armstrong’s interview with Ms. Winfrey, Mrs. Andreu was on the 
set of CNN.312  Teary-eyed, her immediate response was: 
“If he can’t say the hospital room happened, how are we 
to believe everything else he said?” . . .  “I want to believe 
that Lance wants to come clean, but this is an indication 
that I can’t” . . .  “You owed it to me Lance, and you 
dropped the ball.  After what you've done to me and what 
you've done to my family, and you couldn't own up to it?  
Now we're supposed to believe you?  You had one chance 
at the truth, and this was it.”313   
Days later, Mrs. Andreu stated in an interview: 
“I was hopeful that he would come completely clean. . . .  
But when I saw the interview, I couldn’t freakin’ believe it.  
He was cherry-picking the truth.  I really felt like calling 
him and saying, you are a moron, you had good intentions 
and you really screwed everything up.  You didn’t seem 
believable at all.”314   
Mr. Andreu added, “The one thing Betsy was waiting for in the interview 
was for Lance to clear her name, and he didn’t do it. . . .  It was so disappointing. . 
. .  His apology was actually hollow and shallow without admitting the hospital 
room incident.”315 
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The Armstrong “admission” illustrates that for some victims, particularly 
where the misconduct is egregious and the damage both severe and far-reaching, 
an admission or apology goes much further than any monetary fine or compliance 
and monitoring system.  Like the hollowness of Armstrong’s apology to Betsy 
Andreu, settlement agreements without an admission or apology leave some 
victims particularly empty and angry.  No amount of money can restore the years 
lost to Mrs. Andreu as her and her husband’s reputations were destroyed.  No 
injunction against Armstrong can give back to Mrs. Andreu the years she lost 
with her children as she worried about the decimation Armstrong caused to her 
family.316   
Similarly, the losses due to the behavior of Wall Street financial 
institutions, such as Citigroup, are widespread throughout the global economy, 
and though the investors within the Citigroup Fund were all sophisticated, the 
collateral consequences of those losses as a result of Citigroup’s misconduct went 
beyond just those investors.  While the SEC and corporations seemingly worry 
about the collateral consequences to the corporation as a result of an admission 
of liability, it appears that Judge Rakoff—and certainly the Stoker jury—was 
concerned about the collateral consequences of Citigroup’s misconduct on the 
public: the everyday people who lost jobs, homes, and livelihoods as a result of a 
decade’s worth of speculation.  It appears that these types of victims also have a 
“public interest” in a settlement agreement.  Where, in some cases, lives have 
been ruined as a result of negligent corporate behavior, one must really ask if the 
public interest is served through “neither admit nor deny” language, particularly 
when there are “admission” options available that limit collateral consequences to 
the corporation.317 
Returning to Judge Rakoff’s opinion in the Citigroup case, it appears he 
had these third-party victims in mind when determining whether the settlement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 See Murphy, supra note 303.  In response to the question, “Do you have any sense of what your 
life might look like if not for the last decade,” Mrs. Andreu responded, “Maybe I would've tried to 
invest my energies in something other than this crap while the kids were at school. I could've 
spent so much more time with them.”  Id. 
317 The question of the extent of closure the legal system ought to provide to victims is beyond the 
scope of this comment.  At times, the legal system is able to provide a punishment that meets the 
victim’s need for closure, but it is inappropriate for the legal system to attempt to meet a victim’s 
need for closure on a case-by-case basis, particularly with the sheer number of cases handled and 
the limited budget available for regulators such as the SEC.  See Bandes, supra note 22, at 1606. 
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agreement was fair, reasonable, and adequate.318  Statutorily, the SEC is required 
only to consider the interests of the investor, the maintenance of fair, orderly and 
efficient markets, and capital formation in determining the public interest in an 
SEC action.319  As mentioned earlier, the SEC argued in Citigroup that it was the 
“sole determiner of what is in the public interest in regard to Consent Judgments 
settling S.E.C. cases.”320  However, Judge Rakoff rejected that argument and made 
a case for expanding the scope of whom the SEC should consider in determining 
the public interest in a settlement agreement.321 
“As a practical matter . . . the requirement that a 
consent judgment be in the public interest is not 
meaningfully severable from the requirements . . . 
that the consent judgment be fair, reasonable, and 
adequate; for all these requirements inform each 
other.  For example, before the Court determines 
whether the proposed Consent Judgment is 
adequate, it must answer a preliminary question: 
adequate for what purpose?  The answer, at least 
in part, is that the settlement must be adequate to 
ensure that the public interest is protected . . . .  
The same analysis applies to the determination of 
the fairness of the settlement.  Before the Court 
determines whether the settlement is fair, it must 
ask a preliminary question: fair to whom?322 
Judge Rakoff then answered the question by stating that the agreement must be 
“fair to the parties and to the public.”323  Judge Rakoff clearly believed the 
settlement agreement was fair to the SEC and Citigroup, yet he expanded the 
scope of consideration by refusing to “equate” the “successful resolution” of the 
SEC’s and Citigroup’s “competing interests” with the resolution of the public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 331–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
319 According to Section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, only the “protection of investors” and 
promotion of “efficiency, competition, and capital formation” are required considerations for the 
SEC in determining whether an action is “necessary or appropriate in the public interest.”  15 
U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012). 
320 Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 331. 
321 Id. at 331–32. 
322 Id. (emphasis added). 
323 Id. at 332. 
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interest.324  In doing this, Judge Rakoff has made a strong case to broaden the 
standard of review of settlement agreements to include not just the investor’s 
interests, but the interests of the public at large as well.   
 Absent Congressional expansion of what the SEC is required to consider 
in determining whether an action is within the public interest, there are several 
other options available to the SEC.  John C. Coffee, Jr., of Columbia University 
Law School, recommends three of them.325  First, the SEC could craft the 
language in such a way where there is an “admission” but not to the extent that 
would trigger collateral estoppel.326 
For example, the admissions made by the 
defendants in the Bank of America and Goldman 
Sachs cases neither conceded materiality nor 
scienter.  Apologizing for a “mistake” (as in 
Goldman Sachs) does not imply that the mistake was 
made with scienter.  Moreover, because the SEC 
typically and increasingly sues major defendants 
based on § 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 
1933, which does not require proof of scienter, the 
settlement of such a negligence-based cause of 
action would not collaterally estop the defendant 
in resisting a scienter-based cause of action under 
Rule 10b-5.  No private cause of action even exists 
under § 17(a), and hence a settlement based on it 
has no direct impact on the defendant’s potential 
private liability (except to the extent material 
omissions are acknowledged, which might suffice 
for § 11 cases).327 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Id. at 335. 
325 Coffee, supra note 163. 
326 See Id. 
327 Id. 
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 Similarly to the “acknowledg[ing] . . . a mistake” admission in Goldman 
Sachs,328 there are other examples of “admissions” the SEC has used within its 
settlement agreements.  In Bank of America, the defendant “acknowledge[d] that 
there is an evidentiary basis for the statements in the Statement of Facts” while 
simultaneously maintaining the position that their acknowledgement was “not an 
admission as to the truth of any such statements or any inferences or legal 
conclusions based on such statements.”329  Additionally, the consent judgment 
stated that the defendant’s “acknowledgement does not bind [it] to such 
statements or any inferences or legal conclusions based on such statements in any 
other litigation or proceeding.”330  As mentioned earlier in this article, in the 
Tenaris and Amish Helping Fund DPAs, both corporations “offered to accept 
responsibility for [their] conduct and to not contest or contradict the factual 
statements” while maintaining the ability to deny the factual statements within the 
agreement in later litigation in which the SEC is not a party.331  What these four 
settlement agreements illustrate is that it is very well possible for the SEC to settle 
a corporate enforcement action with an “admission” while limiting collateral 
consequences to the company.  This option strongly considers the public interest 
in a full disclosure of the facts within the document as well as an acknowledgment 
of or an apology for the misconduct that was done. 
 Professor Coffee’s second option is exactly what the SEC has done with 
Judge Rakoff’s ruling: either take the corporation to trial or appeal the judge’s 
decision.332  The result of that option is still unresolved as we wait for the Second 
Circuit’s decision.  The third option is for the SEC to settle with defendants for 
monetary damages and not seek injunctive relief from the courts.333  In this line of 
thinking, the SEC could use DPAs and NPAs as settlement options, while 
possibly negotiating even higher monetary penalties, as many corporations would 
likely be willing to pay an additional amount so as not to be enjoined.334  Given 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 Consent Judgment, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229 (BSJ), 2010 WL 2779309, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
329 Consent Judgment, SEC v. Bank of America Corp., Nos. 09-CV-6829 (JSR), 10-CV-0215 
(JSR), 2010 WL 430122, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
330 Id. 
331 Deferred Prosecution Agreement—Tenaris, S.A., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 17, 2011); 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement—Amish Helping Fund, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 17, 
2010). 
332 Coffee, supra note 163. 
333 Id. 
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the SEC’s unwillingness to pursue contempt actions against corporate defendants 
subject to injunctions, Professor Coffee questions whether injunctive relief is 
even all that important to the SEC.335  However, while this option may very well 
settle the SEC’s problem in getting federal district judges to approve their 
settlements, it still does not solve the “public interest” problem they face due to 
lack of “admissions.” 
 A fourth option I would like to propose is requiring the use of victim 
impact statements, which are  procedurally used at sentencing within the criminal 
court system as part of certain SEC settlement agreements.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 
3771(a)(4), a crime victim has the “right to be reasonably heard at any public 
proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole 
proceeding.”336  While it is the prosecutor’s duty to represent the people at trial, 
the prosecutor was not personally affected by the criminal conduct, and may not 
be fully aware of or able to represent the price the victim has paid.337   
The justification for victim impact statements is fourfold.  First, victim 
impact statements provide information about the full harm of the defendant’s 
crime to the judge or jury—the sentencer—so that a proper sentence can be 
determined.338  Second, victim impact statements provide a means of closure to 
the victim, as they are given the opportunity for participation and input within the 
legal proceeding.339  Third, victim impact statements help a defendant understand 
and gain empathy toward the victim and thus may serve as the first step towards 
the defendant’s rehabilitation.340  Fourth, victim impact statements provide a 
sense of fairness in the overall process of sentencing.341  At sentencing, while the 
prosecutor is heard, and the defendants and her supporting witnesses are heard, it 
seems only fair that the victim—the one who bore the brunt of the defendant’s 
wrongdoing—should also be heard.342 
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336 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2009). 
337 Cassell, supra note 22, at 613. 
338 Id. at 620. 
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341 Id. at 624. 
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 Granted, an SEC enforcement action is a civil action and not a criminal 
action, but given the reluctance to criminally prosecute a corporation since Arthur 
Andersen, and the adoption of DOJ tools by the SEC to aid in their enforcement 
actions, the SEC has become the main watchdog of a significant portion of 
corporate America with respect to misconduct in financial reporting and related 
issues.  If this is truly a reality, and the SEC continues to settle the vast majority 
of their cases using settlement agreements, the question arises whether an entire 
swath of the public interest will ever be considered in an SEC enforcement 
action.  Up until now, the SEC has made unambiguous that the public interest 
considered within their settlement agreements is solely that of the investor.  But 
what the Great Recession has made apparent is that there are collateral 
consequences beyond the losses suffered by sophisticated institutional investors, 
particularly when those institutional investors are managing pension and 
retirement funds of everyday Americans.343  Like a prosecutor in a criminal case, 
the enforcement staff has not personally experienced the consequences of the 
victims’ losses, and thus, may not be fully aware of or even be able to represent 
the price the victims have paid.  In those cases, permitting a corporation to settle 
an SEC enforcement action without considering third-party victims or the extent 
of harm caused by the corporation’s misconduct beyond the monetary amount of 
the direct investors’ losses would effectively turn a blind eye to those third-parties 
that may have lost the most.344  This solution could be accomplished by either 
amending federal law requiring victim impact statements be a part of any SEC 
settlement agreement or on a case-by-case basis to be determined by the court.  
Granted, this option would mean more work for the SEC, as they would likely be 
the party required to solicit victim impact statements, and it may be infrequent as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 See Press Release, Pew Study Finds 61 Cities’ Retirement Systems Face $217 Billion Gap,, THE PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 15, 2013),http://www.pewstates.org/news-room/press-releases/pew-
study-finds-61-cities-retirement-systems-face-217-billion-gap-85899442677) (attributing some of 
the losses to pension funds to the Great Recession); Jill Schlesinger, A Real Retirement Plan Crisis, 
MONEYWATCH (May 15, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505146_162-57434873/a-real-
retirement-plan-crisis/ (reporting that retirement accounts lost a third of their value due to the 
recession and market crash). 
344 In contemplation of Bernard Madoff’s sentencing hearing in perpetrating a $50 billion Ponzi 
scheme, prosecutors submitted 113 victim impact statements to Federal District Judge Denny 
Chin.  Of those victims, nine made oral statements at the hearing.  Upon Judge Chin’s sentencing 
of Mr. Madoff to 150 years in prison, the victims present at the hearing briefly applauded and 
cheered.  See Letter from Lev. L. Dassin, Acting U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y., to Hon. Denny Chin, 
U.S. District Judge, S.D.N.Y. (Jun. 12, 2009), (available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/blogs/dealbook/madoff_victims_impact.PDF); Diana B. 
Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 29, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html?ref=bernardlmadoff&_r=0. 
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the harm done would have to be particularly egregious, severe and far-reaching.  
But where a corporation seeks to neither admit nor apologize in a settlement 
agreement for corporate wrongdoing that has had severe, far-reaching 
consequences, the public interest at large must also be considered prior to 
execution of the agreement.  Perhaps this is what Judge Rakoff was alluding to 
when he wrote: 
[I]n any case like this that touches on the 
transparency of financial markets whose gyrations 
have so depressed our economy and debilitated 
our lives, there is an overriding public interest in 
knowing the truth.  In much of the world, 
propaganda reigns, and truth is confined to 
secretive, fearful whispers.  Even in our nation, 
apologists for suppressing or obscuring the truth 
may always be found.  But the S.E.C., of all 
agencies, has a duty, inherent in its statutory 
mission, to see that the truth emerge; and if it fails 
to do so, this Court must not in the name of 
deference or convenience, grant judicial 
enforcement to the agency’s contrivances.345 
 While the use of victim impact statements within a settlement agreement 
generates a number of procedural questions, from a policy perspective, it is 
another means to air the truth of the corporation’s misconduct, provide closure 
to third-party victims, and ensure that the settlement agreement truly is within the 
public interest at large. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this comment, I have discussed the changing face of corporate 
prosecutions over the past 15 years as well as the SEC’s recent adoption of new 
prosecutorial tools—namely DPAs and NPAs—that enhance their enforcement 
efforts.  Given the SEC’s intention to increase their use of these DPAs and 
NPAs, there is an increased probability that the truth of corporate misconduct 
may never be fully known, as these settlement agreements generally allow a 
defendant to “neither admit nor deny” the appended Statement of Facts.  It is 
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exactly because the truth of the corporate misconduct may be swept under the 
rug that federal district court judges and the public at large have become so 
critical of recent SEC settlement agreements.  Even with the SEC’s policy change 
to no longer use “neither admit nor deny” language where there is a parallel 
criminal prosecution, reform is still needed.  It is in circumstances where the 
conduct of the corporation is particularly egregious—and the resulting impact on 
certain types of victims is both severe and far-reaching—that the public interest, 
beyond the investors, must be considered within SEC settlement agreements.  
This article has posed two options which address this concern: acknowledge 
negligence and apologize within the document while simultaneously preserving 
the corporation’s right to deny the allegations in later private actions, or use 
victim impact statements as a way to reveal the harm of the corporation’s actions, 
determine whether an admission or apology is appropriate under the 
circumstances, and ensure that the settlement agreement is within the public 
interest at large.  In those circumstances where victim impact statements are 
deemed appropriate, they not only aid in disclosing the full extent of the 
corporation’s misconduct, but they also provide a means of closure to the public 
at large, something that is largely missing in the wake of the financial crisis and 
Great Recession. 
